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Learning from Late Night
Jordan Hancock, Virginia Commonwealth University
Essay Summary

Late Night with Seth Meyers is an American soft news and political satire NBC television
program. To investigate whether Late Night possesses the qualities to influence political thinking
among political novices, a content analysis was conducted based on data collected from a coding
sheet. The coding sheet was designed with questions regarding relevant political content to
measure the various qualities of humor and political communication within Late Night. A survey
that replicated the code sheet was created; this allowed two researchers1 to take the survey and
analyze their collected data from the first segments of 50 randomly chosen season 9 Late Night
episodes that aired from September 20, 2021, to January 31, 2022. The coder's responses suggest
that Late Night with Seth Meyers produces emotionally charged facts that can affect consumers'
attitudes but do not establish the proper contexts and insights to influence the behaviors or
cognitions of the average American citizen, who tends to fall into the category of a political
novice. The findings of this study raise awareness about pseudo-satire news media and highlight
that a lack of context and intersectionality can hinder the learning process of political novices.
The findings suggest that Late Night is predominately consumed by middle to upper-class white
males interested in politics, individuals who tend to be political sophisticates.
The news media is the filter for the public to receive political information; it
demonstrates proper political behavior and societal values. Intentionally or unintentionally, the
media affects consumers' attitudes on political topics, candidate preference, or party affiliation.
The media may also affect consumers' behaviors, such as influencing voter turnout, financial
1

I would like to formally thank Natalie Hale for her contribution to the content analysis as a secondary coder. Her
code sheet response data is used for the intercoder reliability measurements.
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campaign contributions, and public discussion of politics (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). Political
dialogue among citizens is the most common non-voting form of political participation in the
United States (Geer, J.G. 2020). Still, affecting consumers' attitudes and behaviors does not
benefit the public unless the media can influence political learning in the cognitions of its
consumers'. Learning effects from news media only occur when a credible source presents
information that is understandable, relevant, and at odds with the consumers' former beliefs; due
to a lack of context, learning effects do not happen from Late Night. It is unlikely that a person
who does not actively watch the news can understand most of the show's political content. Late
Night exemplifies that political satire programs should present political information with context
to effectively cultivate learning of relevant political knowledge within a political novice
audience.2
Implications

Political learning for news is influenced by how information is presented and how it is
processed (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). A political novice is a person who is not experienced in
politics; they know very little about government and have little political involvement, such as
attending protests or voting in local elections. Contrarily, a political sophisticate is a person who
is actively involved in politics; they vote, donate, endorse politicians, and keep up to date on
current political happenings within the country. A person with high political sophistication has a
wide range of knowledge about the government and its policies, such as the required steps to
pass a bill into law or the process of impeaching a president. A person with low political
sophistication is not interested in watching hard news programs such as FOX or MSNBC News
2

This paper does not include research on what a political novice can learn from the information presented in Late
Night. Instead, this paper focuses on whether a political novice can learn. This paper looks at if Late Night meets
the standards of the learning effects model by providing receivable, understandable, and relevant content that
comes from a credible source and is at odds with former beliefs. Various political scientists endorse the learning
effects model, determining that the media can only have learning effects on its consumers if the content meets the
standards set by the learning effects model (Graber, D.A. et al., 2017).
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and would not be able to name the current representatives of their state; they only vote in
national elections, whereas sophisticates exercise their right to vote as often as possible. After
watching the news, a political sophisticate is able to correctly answer questions about the
contexts, procedures, insights, and facts from the program (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017).
In 1987 political scientist Robert Luskin proposed that political sophistication is
measured by an individual's exposure to political information alongside their motivation and
ability to understand and comprehend it. Luskin later defined political sophistication as the
differentiation and integration of a person's political cognitions, meaning that a person's political
sophistication is the extent to which they can recall and organize political information and
opinions (Luskin, R. C. 1990). A person's political belief system (PBS) is determined by their
political cognitions and constraints.3 Three dimensions of the political belief system are looked at
when measuring political sophistication:
1) the amount of political knowledge one already has; what do they know about politics?
2) the range of their information; what political categories does their knowledge reside in? 3) the
constraint of their knowledge; how organized and accessible is that information? (Luskin, R.C.
1987).
Political socialization is an individual's ability to understand and organize political
information. In Mass Media and American Politics, Doris Graber4 asserts that political
socialization is affected by an individual's exposure to political information, meaning that
exposure to political communication, via the mass media or in daily life, affects an individual's
interest and engagement in politics (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). Graber further asserts that
3

A constraint is an organized belief or attitude one associates with a political topic.
Doris Graber (1923-2018) was an American Political Scientist that helped to establish and shape the field of
media and politics through her book, Mass Media and American Politics (10th Edition). The Political
Communication Section of the American Political Science Association has awarded the ‘Doris Graber Book
Award’ since 2000 in her honor.
4
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individuals with low levels of political sophistication make up approximately 75% of American
citizens. In contrast, the remaining 25% of Americans are highly politically sophisticated and
selectively expose themselves to political content.
The two groups are separated by what political scientists call the knowledge gap, which
compares people with high political knowledge to those with low levels. The average American
is aware of an extensive array of political topics due to informative messages within the media,
such as entertainment programs and video games, but consumers often do not know the details
about those topics (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). Political novices are prone to accepting news
media's views regarding political topics since they do not have experience or proper political
socialization to guide them. Contrarily, political sophisticates use news media for information
and as a jumping-off point for reaching conclusions regarding a topic; they often reject or ignore
attitudes and evaluations presented by the news media (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017).
Political novices and sophisticates use the media differently. Political scientist Zizi
Papacharissi examined factors of different groups' media choices to determine the motivations
behind consumers' media use (Stacks, D. et al., 2009). The difference in political media
consumption between novices and sophisticates can be explained by the uses and gratifications
theory, which holds that consumers use media to satisfy specific needs or desires (Lule, J. 2012).
A political sophisticate would use the media to stay up to date on current supreme court judicial
rulings. In contrast, a political novice would use the media to ask questions such as "how old do
you have to be to run for president?"
Additionally, Graber proposes that factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, age, income,
education, region, and city size can also affect an individual's media consumption and exposure.
Political sophisticates are typically upper-class members of society; the higher an individual's
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income, the more likely they are to vote (Geer, J.G. 2020). Due to technological advancements in
media consumption, political sophisticates have become more knowledgeable about politics and
expanded the knowledge gap; the wealthy have more access to media outlets and can acquire
information faster than those with lower socioeconomic statuses. The increase in entertainment
has caused political novices to become less knowledgeable because of the endless entertainment
options available. Since novices do not actively seek political information, they are not as
exposed as sophisticates, and factual political learning happens for political novices through soft
rather than hard news. Soft news can gain novices' attention by presenting accessible
information; attention is a prerequisite for learning (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017).
For political media to influence the learning of its audience, individuals must integrate
the presented content with prior knowledge to develop new knowledge (Mayer, R. E. 2002). Two
information processing models measure the extent to which a person can integrate political
information into their working memory; the working memory is where learners actively select
and organize the information (Persuh M. et al., 2018). The working memory is also where a
person's political belief system resides (Wilker, H.R. 1970). The first model, the memory model
of information processing, explains the information processing of political sophisticates (Zaller.
1992). Political sophisticates are more stimulated by new information and thus more likely to
remember it; they typically have a large array of schemas that allow them to retain more news
stories that go beyond the cognitions of political novices (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). The
memory model explains that political sophisticates can maintain content considerations that are
accessible, and their opinions carry more weight in response due to a recollection of detail.
Conversely, the online information processing model demonstrates that sensory or "short-term"
memory is the first place received information is processed (Mayer, R. E. 2002). When political
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information is presented to political novices, opinions are formed immediately and often
reinforce prior beliefs (Lodge et al., 1989). The online model explains that a positive or negative
emotional response in sensory memory is where political novices form an opinion. Working and
sensory memory have similar functions, but the sensory memory processes information
temporarily; it is not until the information is assessed and understood that it reaches long-term
memory (Lule, J. 2012).
The learning effects5 theory is the current model used to measure political communication
within the media; it requires that the audience receive news content that is understandable,
relevant, at odds with former beliefs6, and credible to influence consumers' political learning.
Reaching all of the steps of the learning effects model does not guarantee an individual will
learn. Still, all the steps are required for political communication to have learning effects on an
individual. Receivable content refers to how accessible the information is; whether it is private,
public, print, or electronic media, can the average person easily access it? Late Night is available
on several streaming services, thereby making it accessible to most Americans. The availability
of the NBC television program prompted the coders to deem Late Night and Seth Meyers as
credible news information sources. The content in Late Night presented the same key topics and
provided similar information throughout each of the 50 segments. If someone is consuming
media that repetitively presents the same information, they are not learning anything new. Still,
the sample size is not large enough, nor is there enough data collected that would lead to any
valid and sound conclusions on if the information is at odds with the former beliefs of a political
5

All parts of the learning effects model are necessary to change consumers' attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions,
yet making it through all steps of the learning effects model does not guarantee that information has been learned.
Before the 1980s, political scientists believed that the media could only affect consumers' attitudes (how they feel
about political topics) and behaviors (their involvement in political activities such as voting or protesting).
However, once it was discovered that the media could also affect the cognitions of its audience, political scientists
determined the bare essentials needed for an audience to experience learning effects from the media.
6
For example, if a person believes that Joe Biden is behind the rise in gas prices but then consumes’ media
blaming gas prices on the war in Ukraine, that media is presenting information at odds with their former belief.
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novice. Nonetheless, survey responses suggest that Late Night does not provide easily
understood or relevant information. Instead, the impact of the content produced by Late Night
has a hypodermic needle effect on the political sophisticates of its audience. The hypodermic
needle theory assumes that the audience is like a sponge that absorbs and retains the information
shared via news media; it holds that the media may influence consumers' political attitudes and
behaviors (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). By looking at how political novices and sophisticates
receive and process political information, the memory and online information processing model
explains why the hypodermic needle effect is not an accurate measure of knowledge gain (Lodge
et al., 1989).
The facts discussed in Late Night forgo the inclusion of context and instead provide
surface-level information in a pseudo-satirical manner that a political novice audience is unlikely
to understand. Genuine satire produces information and insight into topics discussed humorously.
In contrast, pseudo-satire presents trivial information in a cynical fashion, most commonly used
as an attack on the competence of political leaders (Peterson, R. L. 2008). After analyzing Late
Night, the findings point to specific people or persons such as Donald Trump and Joe Biden as
the focal point of Late Night's political information, constituting it a pseudo-satirical program;
political topics such as the Capitol Attack and Bidens Build Back Better Act were a sub-focal
point. Pseudo satirical political content decreases media credibility, eliminating a necessary
factor in the learning effects model. A common component of pseudo-satirical content is a heavy
focus on characters which can harm democracy as seen by the Daily Show effect, which suggests
that humor-based content corresponds with an increase in political efficacy but a decrease in
public perceptions of trustworthiness in political candidates (Baumgartner, J., & Morris, J. S.
2006).
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If the audience perceives a source is credible, they are more likely to trust the information
presented. However, Pew Research Center found that only 22% of US adults have high trust in
the government. A decline in candidates' trust leads to a reduction in citizen involvement in
political activity. Personal trust in the government varies depending on age, race, ethnicity,
education, and income; trust is linked to how one views the government (Rainie, L. 2020).
Although men and women vote at similar rates, men usually have higher political sophistication
than women because women are generally less frequently involved in non voting political
activities, such as attending speeches and having political discussions (Kittilson, M.C. 2016).
In 1992, the European Summit on Women in Decision-Making found that the
under-representation of women in decision making is a loss for society; subsequently, in 1995,
AP News reported findings from a survey that suggested television endorsements made by
women are more credible than their male counterparts (Goldman, K. 1995). However, the
Georgia Human Rights and Education Center still finds that women are underrepresented in
politics, stating that a low ratio of women in politics is a phenomenon for democracies (Cunanan,
P. 2020). Of the 157 countries that elect their leaders, only 11 have female Heads of State.
Furthermore, Pew Research Center found that women make up only 27% of the US Congress
(Blazina, C. & DeSilver, D. 2021). Mack D. Mariani, Political Science Department Chair at
Xavier University, conducted a study to examine whether individual-level gender-related
differences affect the likelihood of female state legislators seeking and winning congressional
office. Mariani found that marital status, age, children, and educational and occupational history
play a role in the lack of women in public office (Mariani, M. 2008).
After studying the difference in how the media covers men and women in politics,
journalist Linda Trimble found that the media normalizes sexism through gendered metaphors,
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stereotypes, and assumptions that undermine the political legitimacy of women (Trimble, L.
2018). British journalist Bim Adewunmi points to the media's trivial scrutinization of female
politicians' as a factor of female underrepresentation in politics. Rather than focusing on the
women themselves, the media often showcases women's fashion choices, sexual pasts, and
childcare arrangements rather than their political beliefs or policies (Adewumni, B. 2014).
Additionally, Shauna Shames, a graduate of Rutgers University-Camden, studied barriers to
women's political participation and found that institutional structures and policies, social and
cultural issues, and psychological and motivational factors hinder women's involvement in
politics. Shames suggests that the media should be given information sessions and trained on
covering women in politics to increase women's political participation (Shames, S. 2013).
Political learning from news platforms is conditioned by the way information is
presented. Despite the many news media outlets available, political scientist Neil Postman says
that the media can decrease the efficacy of political learning by trivializing the world's problems
(Graber, D. A. et al., 2017). Accordingly, Late Night may damage public perception of politics
by presenting political content with a conflict frame; this frame is prominent when the speaker
focuses on the processes rather than the substance of specific topics (Atkinson, M. L. 2017).
Political scientists Scott Keeter and Cliff Zukin have claimed that most citizens are too
uninformed to make intelligent political choices. When citizens are uninformed, they often
ignore civic duties, such as voting in state elections, which hinders the democratic process and
exemplifies why political satire and soft news media programs should aim to increase the
learning of a political novice audience and provide their audience with information that is
understood, relevant, at odds with former beliefs and from a credible source. The images
produced by the media convey perceptions in audience members that meld the media stimuli
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with an individual's perceptual state when information is received. Media outlets should focus on
expanding novices’ knowledge rather than sophisticates. The media is least likely to influence
the learning of political sophisticates because they have direct or vicarious political experiences
and already have formed opinions grounded in their values (Graber, D. A. et al., 2017).
Nonetheless, despite the plethora of facts within Late Night, the findings suggest that the
show does not have learning effects on political sophisticates or novices; instead, Late Night
aims to update political sophisticates on current government drama using a conflict frame.
Specifically, the findings suggest that to influence the cognitions of Americans, the content
within Late Night and other political satire programs should provide context surrounding
interactions, concepts, and situations, speak to the relevancy, and include diverse areas of interest
in the types of political information conveyed.
Evidence

Context is required for political novices to understand the political content discussed.
Late Night did not provide context for the topics discussed 43.1% of the time, and only 33.3% of
the segments contained "brief context.7" The lack of context reinforces the notion that Late Night
is produced to update political sophisticates on political happenings within the country and uses a
conflict frame that furthers the knowledge gap between political sophisticates and political
novices.
Late Night incorporates many facts relating to politically relevant information but
provides no insights. 100% of the segments contained politically relevant information conveyed
humorously and 98% focused on news intended for a national audience. Facts corresponding to

7

When segments were coded for “brief context,” the speaker did not paint a clear picture of the discussed topic.
A person who is considered a political novice does not actively seek out political news. As such, coders were to
determine whether or not the segment would be confusing to a political novice who was not predisposed to the
information beforehand.
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national democratic processes were present in 72.5% of the segments. In 86.3% of those
segments, the information corresponded more closely to the left side of the political ideology
spectrum. The most prominent facts mentioned were those pertaining to government 'characters'
and renowned political figures; 80.4% of the segments focused on specific people. The persons
of focus throughout Late Night were predominantly white men, such as Joe Biden, who was
mentioned in 84.3% of segments, and Donald Trump, who was mentioned in 56.9%. Topics were
coded as the focus of the segment 78.4% of the time; 88.2% of the topics within this category
were considered to be legislative-related. The most common legislative topic discussed was
President Biden's Build Back Better Act, which was discussed 50% of the time.
Minority groups such as women, people of color, and the LGBTQ+ community were
underrepresented in Late Night. Apart from Joe Biden and Donald Trump, the most frequently
mentioned man was Senator of West Virginia, Joe Manchin, in 38% of the segments. Conversely,
the two most mentioned women were Vice President Kamala Harris, a black woman, in only
10% of the segments, and Nancy Pelosi, a white woman, in 14%. Despite Nancy Pelosi being
Speaker of the House, of the 14% of segments she was mentioned in, only 9% regarded
legislative matters. Late Night mentioned women's rights in 1.1% of the segments and abortion
only once, while Texas Governor Greg Abbott was mentioned in 4% of segments; Abbott signed
the Heartbeat Bill into law on May 19, 2021, which aims to decrease abortion rates by penalizing
physicians for performing abortions after a heartbeat is detected (Walter, J. 2021). However, the
statement about abortion was quoted from White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki and was
unrelated to the Texas legislation; rather than discussing abortion, Meyers joked that Pope
Francis and Joe Biden were not going to speak about it. Late Night did not give the audience any
context regarding the conversation between the Pope and Biden.
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Topics related entirely to women and other minority groups, such as the LGBTQ+ and
black communities, were not prominent in any segment. Although Late Night spoke of President
Biden’s communication with Russian President Vladimir Putin in 16% of the segments, Late
Night did not mention that Biden communicated with him on December 30, 2021 that the United
States will support LGBTQ+ rights abroad (Lavers, M. K. 2021). Further, since the murders of
Breonna Taylor and George Floyd in May 2020, the Black Lives Matter movement has gained
publicity, and in September 2021, 55% of U.S. adults had expressed support for the movement
(Horowitz, J.M. 2022). NBC mentioned the George Floyd trial as recently as April 12, 2022,
showing that George Floyd and the movements following his murder are still politically relevant
news topics (NBC News. 2022). Late Night, on the other hand, did not discuss topics regarding
the Black Lives Matter8 movement in any of the segments outside of mentions of police
misconduct-related content9 present in 1.1% of episodes and mentions of protests in 2%.
The first segment in each episode was the opening monologue presented by Seth Meyers,
which covers current political stories and news; however, the monologue primarily covers topics
centered around white men in power and often lacks intersectionality. Kimberlé Crenshaw
defined intersectionality in 1989 as an analytical framework highlighting the different modes of
discrimination and privilege derived from a person's social and political identities (Gharib, S. E.
2022). The lack of intersectionality within Late Night is in line with findings from a graduate of
the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Elisa Perez. Perez analyzed Primetime and Late Night

8

Topics that would have been coded as regarding the Black Lives Matter movement are any conversation or
statement regarding systematic racism, mention of people of color who have experienced police brutality, or
mention of the Black Lives Matter protests, such as why they occurred, when they occurred, or what happened as
a result of the protests.
9
Police misconduct-related content does not necessarily mean police brutality. The police misconduct-related
content was about the Kyle Rittenhouse trial in November 2021. Coders had prior knowledge regarding the trial,
but Late Night did not present the audience with the context that Rittenhouse was on trial for the shooting of three
men at a police brutality protest in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Late Night only stated that Rittenhouse would be going
on trial.
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shows in Europe and the United States and found that men tend to speak of political topics that
pertain to them (Perez, E. P. 2020). Late Night does not provide relevant information about these
minorities which caters the show to a white male audience and reinforces the patriarchal power
dynamic within the American political system (Forthun, E. 2020).
The tone used to present information was comedic 65.7% of the time, 75.5% of the
content was described as political satire, and 25.5% was considered politically informative. The
January 6, 2021 insurrection was mentioned in 34% of the segments; it is a common conspiracy
that voter fraud caused Joe Biden to win the 2020 election, which inspired the attack. Still,
despite 4% of the coded segments mentioning voter fraud and 12% of the segments discussing
the 2020 election, Late Night did not discuss the implications of the possible voter fraud that
occurred during the 2020 election (Rojas-Castillo, E. 2020). Instead, the mentions of voter fraud
regarded the Dominion Voting Systems' lawsuit against My Pillow CEO, Mike Lindell. The facts
Late Night provided surrounding the insurrection referred to subpoenas issued to former
President Donald Trump and members of his then-presidential cabinet and about the judicial
proceedings of persons who took part in the insurrection. Similarly, in the discussion of Biden's
Build Back Better Act, Late Night only provided facts regarding when the Senate planned to vote
on the act and Joe Manchin's opposition. Late Night never discussed the substance of the Build
Back Better Act, nor why Joe Manchin opposed the act. A less frequently discussed topic was
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in August 2021, mentioned in only 8% of
episodes. Despite the tragedy that ended the 20-year war between the U.S. and Taliban, Late
Night only provided facts surrounding General Mark Milley's first appearance before the House
since the removal (Senate RPC, 2021). The only information regarding the tragedy was that
Biden withdrew American troops from Afghanistan. Late Night does not provide context beyond
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that required for a political sophisticate to be able to understand. An individual who qualifies as a
political sophisticate would already be interested in the news regarding the trials following
Afghanistan and would not need as much context as a political novice since sophisticates have
the motivation to use other media sources to remain informed.
The content of Late Night is meant for political sophisticates, who follow the uses and
gratifications approach in media consumption. The uses and gratifications theory assumes that
consumers are actively seeking out news media and typically choose to ignore news stories that
are personally irrelevant and present messages that are unappealing to the individual consumer
(Stacks, D. 2009). People who dislike the media they consume are less likely to vote. Despite the
United States census finding that the 2020 election had the highest voter turnout of the 21st
century, one-third of eligible voters did not vote in the 2020 presidential election (Chamie, J.
2021). Non-voters, like political novices, do not feel obligated to stay politically informed
(Woodard, C. 2020). Since race, gender, and socioeconomic status factor into political
sophistication, sophisticates often have different interests and attitudes than novices about
politics. When novices do not vote, they become politically underrepresented, and the 25%
minority of political sophisticates becomes the majority. In 1957 Anthony Downs published An
Economic Theory of Democracy, which proposed the median voter theory. The theory holds that
if voters select candidates based on ideology and everyone participates equally, the party closer
to the middle will win (Black, J. et al., 2009). For a democratic society to thrive, the media must
endorse political participation by providing relevant and understandable information to a
political novice audience.
Methods

The analysis of Late Night with Seth Meyers' ability to influence and affect the learning
and knowledge of political novices was centered around four primary questions;
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(1) Does Late Night with Seth Meyers contain politically relevant content? (2) What type of
political content is presented? (3) Is that information presented to inform the average American
citizen? (4) How is that information conveyed to the audience?
After deriving an additional 30 questions from the four research questions and designing
a 34-question codebook10 a survey was created via SurveyMonkey and applied to the opening
monologues in each episode. The analysis was done on Season 9 since it is the most recent
season; a random number generator selected the 50 episodes the coders watched. The survey
includes eight questions to collect personal information from the coders, as well as information
related to the show that identified each episode. Three of the questions were designed to
determine if the content was politically relevant and humorous and included check-box questions
consisting of 36 possible variables that were intended to be broad identifiers of relevant political
information such as foreign affairs, Donald Trump, judicial topics, and state police powers. Four
of the questions corresponded to the types of processes11 discussed, regarding whether they
focused on international, national, or state government processes, and three questions related to
any facts, contexts, or insights12 presented. The survey also asked three questions about outside
media sources and whether they were portrayed positively or negatively by Seth Meyers13.
Questions were posed to determine the political bias, the central topic of the content
covered, and identify any inclusion of celebrity news related to politics; these questions allowed
10

The codebook is available upon request from the author; it contains the terms and definitions provided to the
coder to take the survey. It presents instructions for coding and examples of political communication identifiers
that could appear in Late Night with Seth Meyers.
11
The processes coders were looking for were interactions between government levels to complete specific
actions. When coding, 'international processes' coders were to look for interactions between US Government
officials and foreign countries or leaders. 'National processes' were executive, legislative, or judicial topics and
topics that affect a large majority of US citizens, such as national elections or the passing and overturning of laws.
Democratic processes such as state governor elections were coded as 'state processes.'
12
Late Night presented facts but did not make projections. When coding for insights, we looked for commentary,
such as discussion of how specific government actions can affect aspects of the future (e.g., the government's
power to tax can lead to corruption).
13
This question was included to determine if Seth Meyers was a credible source; responses provided no
conclusive data.
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us to determine Late Night's intended audience. The remaining questions recognized the tone,
focus level of the information (whether it was aimed at a state, national, or international level),
the amount of context provided, and the overall type of political content portrayed in the
segments. The intercoder reliability (ICR)14 for determining if each unit of analysis (UoA)
contains politically relevant information was 100%.
Similarly, the findings relating to abortion, police misconduct, protests, voter fraud,
LGBTQ+, and Black Lives Matter movements also had 100% ICR. Unfortunately, the rest of the
findings did not have as high intercoder reliability. Coders had 32% ICR regarding the
information being focused on a national news level, 35% when selecting "national processes' ' as
the type of processes mentioned in the segment, and 22% on the political affiliation of Late
Nights' content. The lowest ICR was -3.8% for people being the main focus of the segment, but
33.6% for topics being the main focus. The ICR was 41.6% for Joe Biden, 52% for Donald
Trump, 18.9% for Joe Manchin, 31% for Kamala Harris, and 56.63% for Nancy Pelosi. The
coders had an ICR of 9.7% for mention of legislative topics and 32% for Biden's Build Back
Better Act, 69% for well-known scandals, 38% for Afghanistan, and 12% regarding the 2020
election. Regarding the comedic tone of the UoA, politically informative content within the
UoA, and context provided, the ICR was 3%, 0%, and 49%, respectively.
Partial responsibility for the low intercoder reliability was due to the categories being too
narrow. The Survey questions provided would better measure political topics rather than
individual people; these factors caused coder disagreement and confusion in categorizing
political topics. Late Night often mentioned political figures' names concerning non-politically

14

Intercoder reliability is the extent to which individual coders evaluate a characteristic or message and reach the
same conclusion (Bracken, C. 2005). Intercoder reliability is important for measuring a content analysis's
reliability, validity, accuracy, and precision since most questions are subjective.
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relevant topics, such as Joe Biden getting the COVID-19 booster shot, making coding more
difficult. Nonetheless, due to short-response options on questions, the survey adequately
accounted for the political content and communication within Late Night with Seth Meyers.
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State Government Responses to Cross-State Air Pollution: The Effect of Problem
Severity
Hayley Schier, College of William & Mary
Abstract

This study examines how the amount of cross-state air pollution a state receives and
contributes influences the amount of effort that state puts into limiting cross-state air pollution
and its effects. Hardly any of the existing literature that seeks to explain variations in
environmental effort examines the problem of cross-state air pollution. Past research into the
effects of problem severity on environmental effort has not been updated or applied to the
interstate transport of pollution. To test this relationship, this study conducts case studies on
Delaware and West Virginia to identify modifications in government behavior in response to
varying levels of cross-state air pollution. The study considers the amount of air pollution
traveling into and out of each state and then analyzes changes in their regulation and
enforcement, the nature of their regulatory competition, and their litigation activity, all
measures of state environmental effort. The analysis found that Delaware, a downwind state,
has engaged in a high level of environmental effort as its government has filed a uniquely high
number of Section 126 Petitions, has adopted strict air quality regulation and monitoring
practices, and appears to be racing to the top. West Virginia, an upwind state, has engaged in
less environmental effort as it was involved in litigation to limit federal efforts to decrease
cross-state air pollution and does not allow its state environmental regulations to exceed the
stringency of federal requirements. Looking into this type of state activity could also clarify
how states try to influence other states’ behavior in the U.S. system of federalism when
addressing issues, such as pollution, that cross borders.
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Key Acronyms

EPA: United States Environmental Protection Agency
CAA: Clean Air Act
CAIR: Clean Air Interstate Rule
CSAPR: Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
DNREC: Delaware Natural Resources and Environmental Control
DEP: Department of Environmental Protection (West Virginia)
FIP: Federal Implementation Plan
NAAQS: National Ambient Air Quality Standards
SIP: State Implementation Plan
Introduction

Air quality in the United States has greatly improved since President Richard Nixon
signed the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970 (Ringquist 1993; EPA 2021h). Under the leadership of
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), states implemented regulations to decrease air
pollution and protect human health. Since 1970, emissions of the air pollutants that the CAA
regulates have dropped by 78 percent (EPA 2021h). A 2011 study from the EPA predicted that
the CAA would prevent 230,000 early deaths in 2020 (EPA 2021b). More recently, the EPA has
attempted to address air pollution that travels from one state to another using the CSAPR, which,
with its subsequent updates, is estimated to produce $2.8 billion in climate and public health
benefits over the next 20 years (EPA 2021i). Despite such progress in air quality regulation,
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cross-state air pollution continues to challenge some states.
Cross-state air pollution presents a complex problem for state and federal regulators. Air
pollution can travel long distances and cross state lines, meaning it can affect constituencies
outside where it was emitted (EPA 2021f; Glasgow & Zhao 2017). A recent study found that
between 41 and 53 percent of premature deaths from a state’s air pollution occur outside of that
state. It also found that states in the Northeast are the net importers of pollution originally
emitted in states upwind from them (Dedoussi et al. 2020). Downwind states have expressed
their frustrations about air pollution from other states, as it has caused many of them to fall
below federal air quality standards (Rabe 2021). Despite downwind states implementing more
stringent regulations, they have little direct control over the pollution that other states emit
(Eichmann 2019). Delaware’s government contends that over 90 percent of the ground-level
ozone in its state has resulted from emissions in other states (Delaware News 2018). That is an
especially pressing issue for Delaware as the EPA has designated two out of three of Delaware’s
counties as nonattainment zones for ground-level ozone (EPA 2021e). Upwind states that
contribute cross-state air pollution often do not have the same air quality problems as downwind
states. West Virginia, a state that exports a significant amount of air pollution because of its high
number of polluting facilities, currently does not exceed any federally established pollution
concentration limits including those set for ground-level ozone (EPA 2022c).
The difference between these states’ experiences suggests the following question: How
does the amount of cross-state air pollution a state receives and contributes influence the
amount of effort that state puts into limiting cross-state air pollution and its effects? To test this
relationship, this study conducts case studies of Delaware and West Virginia to identify
modifications in government behavior in response to more severe cross-state air pollution
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problems. The analysis shows that Delaware has engaged in substantial environmental effort to
address cross-state air pollution. Delaware’s government has, between the years of 2011 to
2021, filed a uniquely high number of Section 126 Petitions under the CAA, adopted strict air
quality regulation and monitoring practices, and appears to be exceeding national standards to
compete with other states, a behavior called racing to the top. West Virginia engaged in less
environmental effort, instead seeking to limit federal enforcement of cross-state air pollution
regulations through litigation. West Virginia has engaged in a large number of enforcement
practices, although has limited its regulatory stringency by preventing state requirements from
being more strict than federal rules.
Theoretical Perspectives On Cross-State Air Pollution And Environmental Effort
Background on Clean Air Act and Cross-State Air Pollution Rule

Through the CAA and the CSAPR, the federal government has tried to address problems
of pollution spillover. The CAA substantially expanded on previous clean air legislation (Portney
1990). It created the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), putting limits on six
common “criteria pollutants” that threaten human health. These criteria pollutants are particulate
matter, which includes suspended liquid and solid particles, as well as ozone, sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, and lead. The CAA also initiated the use of State
Implementation Plans (SIPs), which require states to present their plans to meet air quality
standards for approval by the EPA (EPA 2021j). The CAA gives authority to the EPA to regulate
cross-state air pollution through the “good neighbor” provision (EPA 2021f, Glasgow & Zhao
2017; “EPA’s Revised CSAPR Update is issued and a single petition for review is filed in the DC
Circuit” 2021). The good neighbor provision requires states and the EPA to reduce air pollution
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that will “contribute significantly to nonattainment in” other states (Clean Air Act of 1970, §
7410). Nonattainment refers to when levels of any of the criteria pollutants exceed those
prescribed in the NAAQS. Downwind states can file a CAA Section 126 Petition to ask the EPA
to limit pollution from a source in another state that impairs air quality across borders
(Environmental and Energy Law Program 2020). Since 2015, the EPA has used the CSAPR and
its subsequent updates to regulate cross-state air pollution and avoid nonattainment in downwind
states.
In 1970, the CAA initiated a command-and-control system to address air pollution.
Command-and-control policies are prescriptive and dictate behaviors such as the amount of
pollution a firm can emit, or the type of control technology firms must install (EPA 2010b).
While deemed effective, command-and-control regulatory systems impose significant costs
on businesses (Glasgow & Zhao 2017). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 introduced
pollution trading, a market-based solution, to address acid rain problems with more cost
incentives for polluters. The Acid Rain Program was a huge success as polluters had the
flexibility to trade their pollution allowances and make the most cost-efficient pollution
reductions (EPA 2021a; Schmalensee & Stavins 2013). The CSAPR and its predecessor, the
Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), have utilized similar trading mechanisms to control the
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides that contribute to the formation of fine
particulate matter and ground-level ozone in downwind states (EPA 2010a; EPA 2021c; Potts
2011).
Both the states and the federal government play a key role in promoting cleaner air
throughout the country. Scholars consider states and the federal government to operate through
a cooperative relationship on environmental policy (Scheberle 2004; Vig, Kraft, & Rabe 2021).
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The different levels of government engage in mutual reliance as states depend on the federal
government for financial and technical support while the federal government entrusts most
implementation duties to the states (Scheberle 2013). This relationship exists because experts
and policymakers expect that without federal oversight, states would lack the capacity and
willingness to properly address environmental issues (Konisky 2015).
As previously mentioned, the CAA requires states to submit SIPs for EPA approval.
These SIPs describe how state regulations will ensure the state can achieve federal air quality
standards. If the EPA does not approve a state’s SIP or finds that a state is not following through
on its plans, the federal government can take full responsibility for implementation in that state
with a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). This action is called preemption. The threat of
preemption by the EPA is designed to motivate states to actually implement better
environmental quality (Scheberle 2004; Potoski 2001). However, most presidential
administrations rarely use FIPs, and the EPA likely lacks the capacity to fully take over
implementation for a state (Scheberle 2013; Scheberle 2005). During the presidential
administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the EPA only implemented one FIP. Under
the Obama administration, the EPA significantly increased its usage of FIPs, filing over 50 while
Obama was in office (EPA 2018). The Trump administration then worked to convert around 20
of these FIPs into SIPs (EPA 2019). Instead of implementing an FIP, the EPA may just allow a
state to submit a new SIP and trust the state to work towards meeting federal standards (Konisky
& Woods 2016). This may occur because the federal government does not have the capacity to
implement FIPs or because the administration prefers to give more autonomy to state
governments.
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Regulatory Competition Between States

Regulatory competition might help explain the variance in states’ environmental
behavior. States may alter their environmental regulation or enforcement based on other states’
behavior to make some type of gains, often economic (Konisky 2007; Rabe 2011; Rabe 2021).
One theory of regulatory competition is race to the bottom, which predicts that states decrease
the stringency of their environmental regulations to attract capital investment and boost their
economies (Konisky 2007). This theory expects that stricter environmental standards put a state
at a competitive disadvantage (Vogel 1997). In clean air policy, a race to the bottom occurs
when states are only regulating to meet national standards. In 2015, 19 states had policies that
prohibited regulatory agencies from adopingt air regulations that went beyond the threshold set
by the federal government (Breggin 2015). Some states may also decrease enforcement of their
regulatory standards to attract industry without visibly changing their regulations (Cao &
Prakash 2012).

Some states seem to be racing to the bottom, but many exceed national regulatory
standards, lending support to an alternative theory of regulatory competition which predicts that
some states race to the top (Scheberle 2005; Potoski 2001; Vogel 1997). When a state like
California implements tougher environmental regulations, that may encourage other states or
companies that do business with California to increase their standards so that they can comply
with the strictest standards. In this situation, increasing regulation or enforcement can be a
source of competitive advantage, rather than a disadvantage (Vogel 1997). States may race to
the top because they think it will bring economic advantages, but also because it might decrease
the incentive for polluting industries to enter the state, bring electoral advantages, and even
influence national policy (Konisky 2007; Rabe 2011). Some scholars argue that there is a lack of
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evidence to support states racing to the bottom and states regulating beyond national standards
is proof of a race to the top (Vogel 1997; List & Gerking 2000; Potoski 2001). States in the
Northeast have lobbied and sued for higher national air quality standards, which is the opposite
of race to the bottom (Scheberle 2005).
There is mixed evidence for these different forms of regulatory competition but
overall, there seems to be a mix of states that regulate at the national standards, states that
innovate and go beyond those standards, and states in the middle of the pack (Rabe 2021).
States respond to other states’ behavior, but in ways that produce vastly different
environmental policy outcomes (Konisky 2007; Grumbach 2018). That leaves the question of
why states act differently in the face of competitive pressures.
What makes regulatory competition more complex in the realm of clean air policy is
the free-rider problem. The race to the bottom theory assumes that political jurisdictions are
willing to endure the costs of worse environmental quality to attract investment and economic
benefits (Konisky 2007). As previously outlined, air pollution is mobile and many of the costs
of pollution in upwind states are felt by citizens in downwind states. Perhaps upwind states
will be more likely to decrease their regulation and enforcement if they are free-riding and not
enduring the full costs of low regulation and high pollution. However, sufficient evidence does
not exist to prove that states intentionally pollute more near state borders, or that they enforce
environmental regulation less near state borders (Glasgow & Zhao 2017; Konisky & Woods
2010). If upwind states were acting strategically to make economic gains while exporting the
pollution to other states, there should be a pattern of lower enforcement, higher emissions, or
both, near state borders.
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Internal State Factors

Environmental effort is a term used to describe how committed a state is to addressing
environmental issues as displayed through its regulations and enforcement, as well as other
activities that promote environmental health and protection. Many scholars have attempted to
identify the factors that cause states to engage in different levels of environmental effort. These
factors can be summed up in four categories: state political ideology, state economic conditions,
interest group power, and problem severity. It is important to acknowledge that different parts of
state environmental programs may have different determinants (Potoski & Woods 2002). Also,
Konisky and Woods (2012) have argued that evidence of these factors’ influence is altered based
on how environmental effort is measured. For example, a factor such as income may have a
different measured effect on environmental effort based on whether a study uses environmental
policy indices, state environmental spending, pollution abatement costs, or counts of regulatory
enforcement actions.
State political ideology does not clearly account for the variation in state
environmental effort. Generally, elected officials from the Democratic Party are considered
to be more favorable towards environmental policies compared to Republicans; liberal
voters are more supportive of government action to address environmental issues (Clayton
2017; Konisky et al. 2008; Vig et al. 2021). However, voter preferences do not always
translate to environmental action by Democratic elected officials. While some studies find
that higher levels of liberalism within a state’s government lead to more pollution reductions
(Glasgow & Zhao 2017), others find that electing Democrats only has a small impact on the
implementation of liberal policies along these lines (Caughey at al. 2017). In fact, studies on
state environmental effort and enforcement behavior have failed to find consistent statistical
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impacts from government ideology (Konisky 2007; Bacot & Dawes 1997).
Economic conditions in a state could influence how a state chooses to regulate or
enforce air quality standards. One theory about the influence of economic conditions is that as a
state increases in economic well-being through measures such as Gross State Product (GSP) or
income, there will be more public demand for strict environmental regulations, resulting in
better environmental quality (List & Gerking 2000; Glasgow & Zhao 2017). This result aligns
with the expected relationship of the environmental Kuznets curve where at some point in
development, further increases in income result in better air quality (Stern 2018).1 Other
scholars have found that higher shares of economic activity made up by manufacturing will lead
to higher amounts of pollution (Ringquist 1993; Konisky 2007). These findings could mean that
fiscal health may not always directly correlate with the stringency of a state’s air quality
regulations.
Voter behavior is another important factor when considering the effect of economic
health. Voters might respond to economic downturns and high unemployment by voting
incumbents, such as the governor, out of office (Atkeson 1995). To avoid lower approval
ratings and electoral losses, governors who have little control over unemployment may choose
to coax industry into the state by lowering environmental regulations or enforcement (Hansen
1999). This behavior could relate to the race to the bottom theory, although these state officials
may not be responding to other states’ behavior but instead just trying to win approval in their
own state. Economic voting will occur when voters connect the behavior of elected officials to
economic conditions. Different factors may influence when voters make this connection, and
1

The environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) is a predicted relationship between income and environmental quality.
The EKC would expect that at lower levels of development, income increases correspond with increases in
environmental degradation, meaning, for example, higher emissions. But the EKC forms an inverted U-shape,
meaning eventually, further increases in income lead to lower levels of environmental degradation. See Stern (2018).
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Ebeid and Rodden (2006) identify natural resource dominance in a state’s economy as one
possible factor. They find that there are fewer signs of economic voting in states whose
economy depends on farming or natural resources, compared to states with more diversified
economies where state officials play a larger role in attracting investment.
Interest group strength is often analyzed as part of either industry strength in the
economy, or as part of the balance of environmental politics in the state (Konisky 2007; Potoski
& Woods 2002). When analyzed individually, there is evidence that environmental interest
group strength has a positive relationship with state environmental effort (Bacot & Dawes
1997). Environmental interest groups may help to translate higher income into tougher
environmental regulations, and their strength could determine where a state sets its own ambient
air quality standards (Potoski & Woods 2002; List & Gerking 2000). When industry interests are
strong in a state, they seem to have a negative influence on environmental effort as businesses
can lobby or threaten to leave the state if the government tries to tighten its environmental
standards (Konisky 2007).
Most scholars agree that when there is higher problem severity, meaning more serious
pollution problems, there will be more state environmental effort (Lowry 1992; Bacot & Dawes
1997; Potoski & Woods 2002). However, many studies that examine problem severity are not
particularly recent (see Lowry 1992; Bacot & Dawes 1997; Potoski & Woods 2002), and a
recent study from Konisky & Woods (2012) did not find problem severity to have a consistent
impact on different parts of state environmental policy. It does seem likely that a state would
increase environmental stringency if it had bad air quality, especially if there were clear negative
health effects. For cross-state air pollution, having higher problem severity could mean
experiencing a higher level of air pollution resulting from other states’ emissions. One state may
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experience a high level of pollution, which is primarily emitted within the state, and another
state could have better overall air quality but a high fraction of its pollution comes from outside
its borders. While both states could be said to have high problem severity, this study will focus
on the severity of cross-state air pollution problems.
Theoretical and Empirical Implications of Previous Work

Scholars agree that different states act with different levels of effort to prevent
environmental degradation. This effort can be measured in different ways, including
measurements of regulation, enforcement, or abatement costs. States seem to act strategically in
how they regulate or enforce environmental policies, sometimes by moving beyond the
regulatory efforts of other states and sometimes by reducing their own efforts. A state’s
economic well-being often predicts levels of environmental effort, and different mechanisms
such as economic voting may produce this result. While findings on problem severity have not
been confirmed in recent years, a number of studies have found that states with higher problem
severity will put in more effort to prevent degradation.
However, there remain disagreements and uncertainties. Scholars disagree on whether
states race to the bottom or race to the top. Konisky (2007) suggests that different states race in
different directions but it is unclear why states choose to act differently. The academic
community also lacks an understanding of the relevance of state party control in determining
state environmental effort. Throughout all of the factors that could influence why a state acts
with more or less effort to improve air quality, disagreement exists over the most important
factor or why some factors are more critical in certain situations than others.
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Which factors cause a state to choose to race to the bottom or race to the top? As
mentioned, different states seem to pursue different strategic paths. How does the institutional
structure of federal clean air policy allow for states to escape or enforce more stringent
standards on cross-state air pollution? The CAA leaves states with enough discretion to vary
widely in their regulation and enforcement of clean air policies. Both of these questions could
help us better understand why states behave as they do and determine which policy solutions
could best address cross-state air pollution.
Methods

This project addresses the following research question: How does the amount of
cross-state air pollution a state receives and contributes influence the amount of effort that state
puts into limiting cross-state air pollution and its effects? This question could also be worded as:
How does problem severity affect environmental effort? These questions allow the study to
focus on problem severity which could be a useful variable to compare and contrast the
difference in behavior from upwind and downwind states. Higher problem severity seems to
result in higher state environmental effort, but these findings have not been recently updated and
have not been applied to the issue of interstate pollution transport. This study measures problem
severity as how much cross-state air pollution a state receives or contributes.
Table 1 presents a typology illustrating the different types of states according to the
amount of cross-state air pollution a state contributes and receives. The four types represented
in the table are separated states, upwind states, downwind states, and mid-wind states.
Identifying these typologies is helpful in developing and working through the causal
relationships that might characterize different types of states. This process also enables us to
home in on the typologies of interest for this study: upwind and downwind states.

36

Hayley Scheir

Table 1: State Pollution Typologies

Pollution Contributed to Other States

Pollution
Received from
Outside the
State

Low

High

I. Separated States

II. Upwind States

Ex. Maine, Arizona

Ex. West Virginia, Wyoming

III. Downwind States

IV. Mid-wind States

Ex. Delaware, Connecticut

Ex. Ohio, Pennsylvania

Low

High

I. Separated States: These states do not contribute much pollution to other states and they do not
receive much pollution from other states. A separated state would not be expected to demonstrate
much effort to reduce cross-state air pollution because it is not affected by emissions from
outside its borders and is not a large contributor to pollution downwind.
II. Upwind States: These states are net exporters of cross-state air pollution and their
emissions contribute significantly to air pollution problems in other states. An upwind state
would be expected to show low levels of environmental effort to decrease cross-state air
pollution because it can profit off of the industries creating pollution. These states would
prefer to continue polluting as usual, without any federal requirements to decrease their
downwind contributions.
III. Downwind States: These states are net importers of cross-state air pollution as they receive
air pollution from upwind states and do not contribute much air pollution to other states. Even
if downwind states have stringent environmental standards, they are not able to achieve better
air quality due to the emissions of other states. A downwind state could be expected to
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demonstrate more environmental effort to decrease or offset cross-state air pollution because
pollution from other states significantly affects its air quality.
IV. Mid-wind States: These both contribute pollution to states downwind from them and receive
pollution from states upwind from them due to weather patterns and their geographic locations.
It is unclear how a mid-wind state would act in response to cross-state air pollution. These states
may have the motivation to increase their environmental effort to limit the pollution coming in
from outside of their state, or they may oppose more federal enforcement as these states could
also bear the costs of decreasing their emissions.
These state types differ based on how much cross-state air pollution they recieve and
contribute. This study anticipates that different levels of cross-state air pollution, as is
experienced by each state type, lead states to engage in different amounts of environmental
effort.
This study predicts that if a state experiences higher levels of air pollution coming in
from outside its borders, it is more likely to exhibit higher amounts of environmental effort to
decrease or offset the effects of that pollution. Environmental effort will be measured by
analyzing three interrelated behaviors. More cross-state air pollution in a state is expected to
lead to that state joining litigation efforts to increase enforcement of federal rules about
cross-state air pollution. A downwind state is likely more motivated to initiate these legal
challenges that could cause the EPA to require more emission reductions from states
responsible for creating air pollution that crosses state borders.2 A state with higher levels of
cross-state air pollution is more likely to increase the stringency of its regulatory and
2

While the CAA also allows groups and individuals to sue polluters, this research will focus on examples where a
state or group of states sues the EPA over emissions from another state.

38

Hayley Scheir

enforcement behaviors and decrease its emissions to offset the pollution coming from outside
its borders. Finally, states with higher levels of cross-state air pollution are more likely to
interact strategically with other states by racing to the top rather than racing to the bottom.
States may be motivated to regulate beyond what is required by the federal government (a
form of racing to the top) to discourage polluters from moving into the state. If states race to
the top, they can be expected to increase the rigor of their regulation and enforcement.
States that contribute high amounts of cross-state air pollution are more likely to
demonstrate less environmental effort. States that are high contributors are less likely to
engage in litigation to increase federal enforcement against upwind polluters as they
themselves are upwind polluters. These states will have little incentive to increase the
stringency of their regulation and enforcement because they benefit from the business of the
polluting industries within their borders while knowing that the emissions from these
companies are exported to other constituencies. Consequently, these states are more likely to
race to the bottom than to the top. These states are unlikely to change their regulations unless
new federal regulation requires it.
Hypotheses

The first set of hypotheses focuses on how receiving different levels of cross-state air
pollution may cause a state to exert different levels of environmental effort. States that endure
more pollution coming from other states will likely pursue behaviors that offset or reduce
cross-state air pollution.

● Hypothesis 1: States that experience higher levels of cross-state air pollution are more
likely to sue the EPA to increase federal enforcement on polluters in upwind states.

39

State Government Responses to Cross-State Air Pollution: The Effect of Problem Severity

● Hypothesis 2: States that receive more cross-state air pollution are more likely to
increase the stringency of their air pollution control measures: both regulation and
enforcement.
The next two hypotheses consider state action conditional on whether states are engaging
in regulatory competition. Two predictions follow.
● Hypothesis 3: If they are engaging in regulatory competition, states that receive higher
levels of cross-state air pollution are more likely to compete with other states by racing
to the top and regulating beyond federal requirements.
● Hypothesis 4: If they are engaging in regulatory competition, states that experience lower
levels of cross-state air pollution are more likely to compete with other states by racing
to the bottom and lowering the stringency of their regulation and enforcement as low as
possible.
The next four hypotheses relate different levels of pollution contributions to the same
measures of environmental effort. They predict that states with higher contributions to other
states’ air pollution problems are likely to demonstrate less environmental effort.
● Hypothesis 5: States that contribute more cross-state air pollution are less likely to sue
the EPA to increase federal and state enforcement on polluters in upwind states.
● Hypothesis 6: States that contribute more cross-state air pollution are more likely
to decrease the stringency of their air pollution control measures.
● Hypothesis 7: If they are engaging in regulatory competition, states that contribute higher
amounts of cross-state air pollution are more likely to compete with other states by
racing to the bottom and lowering the stringency of their regulation and enforcement as
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low as possible.
● Hypothesis 8: If they are engaging in regulatory competition, states that contribute
higher levels of cross-state air pollution are less likely to race to the top and regulate
beyond federal requirements
Case Selection

This study aims to investigate the pollution levels and the environmental effort of
Delaware and West Virginia. Conducting case studies of these two states will allow this study to
test and further understand the theories behind downwind and upwind states’ motivations and
behaviors.
Delaware is a model example of a downwind state as it is a net receiver of cross-state air
pollution. Delaware well represents other downwind states that lack political influence but must
respond to severe cross-state air pollution problems. Located on the East Coast, Delaware
receives significant amounts of air pollution produced by states to the west. Delaware does not
have significant political power as it has a population of just over one million people and has the
ninth smallest state economy in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2021a; Kaiser Family
Foundation 2019). The levels of industrial toxins within the state are among the highest in the
country, despite Delaware not having a large number of polluting industries within its borders.
In 2021, there were 127 polluting facilities operating in Delaware, including several large
DuPont chemical plants. But Delaware still has fewer polluting facilities than most states, and
has far below the average number of polluting facilities per state which was over 800 in 2021
(EPA 2022a). In recent years, Delaware’s government has blamed Delaware’s air pollution on
polluting industries in other states, highlighting the issue of cross-state air pollution (Delaware
News 2018; Eichmann 2019).
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A case study on Delaware will reveal some of the motivations held by state governments
that encounter high levels of cross-state air pollution. Despite being a small state, Delaware has
attempted to use its institutional powers to force upwind polluters to change their actions and the
federal government to toughen their policies on upwind polluters. As such, Delaware can be
expected to engage in high amounts of environmental effort to combat the issue of cross-state
air pollution, consistent with Hypotheses 1 through 4. The state would be expected to engage in
litigation to change the amount of air pollution it receives from other states. Delaware would
also be expected to race to the top and increase the stringency of its own regulation and
enforcement to offset the impact of cross-state air pollution.
West Virginia is a typical upwind state as it is a net contributor of cross-state air
pollution. Due to its geographic location and its economic dependence on profits from energy
production, West Virginia contributes high levels of cross-state air pollution to other states. West
Virginia is among the country’s largest producers of coal and natural gas (IEA 2021). It is also
home to more than double the number of polluting facilities as Delaware (EPA 2022a). The EPA
has linked West Virginia to downwind air quality problems and has lowered West Virginia’s
emissions budget with different versions of the CSAPR (EPA 2021i). Similar to Delaware, West
Virginia is a state with a small population and a small economy (U.S. Census Bureau 2021b;
Kaiser Family Foundation 2019). West Virginia currently holds significant federal political
influence because of Senator Joe Manchin’s power in the Senate. All of these factors may be
important to keep in mind as this study analyzes the methods that West Virginia has used to
achieve its economic and environmental policy preferences.
West Virginia can be expected to engage in low levels of environmental effort, at or near
what is required by federal regulations. West Virginia gains economic benefits from its polluting
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facilities and bears fewer of the costs because some of its pollution travels outside its borders.
As outlined in Hypotheses 5 through 8, West Virginia is less likely to sue the EPA to increase
enforcement on upwind states, to increase the strictness of its own regulation and enforcement,
or to race to the top. Instead, West Virginia is expected to oppose the EPA’s efforts to increase
enforcement through litigation of its own. While West Virginia has been required by the EPA to
add new air pollution control measures, the hypotheses predict that it will only adopt regulations
that are legally required. If West Virginia is engaging in regulatory competition, it can be
expected to race to the bottom.
Sources of Data

To measure the severity of cross-state air pollution in Delaware and West Virginia and
their responses, this study uses data from a range of sources from 2011 to 2021 with a focus on
ground-level ozone as it is the primary criteria pollutant affected by cross-state air pollution.
This time period is compelling because the CSAPR was finalized in 2011, representing the start
of an era with more government attention on cross-state pollution and more available data, as
well as because of the lowering of the federal ground-level ozone concentrations standard from
0.075 ppm to 0.070 ppm that occurred in 2015, which makes it more difficult for downwind
states to escape nonattainment.
A portion of the data used for this analysis was retrieved from the EPA’s databases,
including the Enforcement and Compliance History Online (ECHO) website and the Green
Book, which reports states’ attainment status. The EPA’s modeling data from 2017 and 2021,
was used to estimate how much pollution each source or state contributes to other states’ ozone
concentrations. Moghani et al. (2018) provided similar contribution data for Delaware from
2011.
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To understand the stringency of the states’ regulations, each states’ air quality
regulations and SIPs were examined to find what new regulations they each implemented in the
past 10 years. For enforcement, this study calculated the amount of enforcement and monitoring
actions that each state took according to its number of polluting facilities to be compared to
national averages.
Some information for this study was obtained from representatives from each states’
government: a Program Administrator from Delaware’s Division of Air Quality and a Technical
Analyst from West Virginia’s Division of Air Quality. The Program Administrator described
how Delaware’s government sees the issue of cross-state air pollution and how state officials
have attempted to respond to the problem. The official spoke of how Delaware’s counties
continue to be classified as nonattainment areas even though Delaware has already made all
feasible emission reductions. The Technical Analyst from West Virginia made it clear that West
Virginia’s government updates its regulations along with federal requirements but that it cannot
adopt anything more stringent than what federal regulations require. The official also
emphasized that West Virginia is one of only 16 states to stay in attainment with all of the
NAAQS. These perspectives will be discussed further in the analysis section.
Variables

The key independent variable for this study is the severity of cross-state air pollution,
measured by how much cross-state air pollution a state contributes and receives. The amount of
pollution each state receives is measured by calculating the proportion of each state’s
ground-level ozone concentrations created by pollution from sources outside their boundaries.
This study focuses on ground-level ozone because it is the most concerning criteria pollutant for
downwind states. EPA rules on cross-state air pollution primarily seek to limit nitrogen oxide
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emissions because they chemically react with other pollutants to create ground-level ozone, the
pollutant with the highest concentrations in downwind states. Additionally, Delaware’s counties
are only in nonattainment for ground-level for ozone (EPA 2021e). For each year, ozone
contributions were totaled, approximating the ozone concentrations both Delaware and West
Virginia will measure in that year. Then the modeled contributions of other states to Delaware
and West Virginia’s ozone concentrations were summed. The contributions to both state’s ozone
concentrations which come from non-state sources such as international pollution or fires were
also totaled. Those calculations were used to find the proportion that each source category has
contributed to Delaware and West Virginia’s ozone concentrations. It should be noted that the
modeled contribution data collected for 2011, 2017, and 2021 vary in a few ways.3 While these
data are not able to provide a fully comparable account of contributions, they are still useful in
understanding the general severity of the problem throughout the period studied. Delaware and
West Virginia pollution contributions to other states was calculated by summing each state’s
contributions to other states for 2017 and 2021 and dividing this by their total ozone
contributions to find the proportion of emissions that go towards ozone formation outside of
their borders.
The dependent variables are measures of the states’ environmental effort. This study
measures environmental effort by considering Delaware and West Virginia’s litigation efforts to
impact federal enforcement of cross-state air pollution rules, the stringency of their regulation
and enforcement, and the nature of their regulatory competition.
Delaware’s litigation activity to alter the federal government’s enforcement of cross-state
air pollution is measured by its filing of Section 126 petitions. A Section 126 Petition involves a
3

For example, different years provided data from different monitoring locations and Moghani et al. did not include
contribution information for non-state sources. Also, the data from 2011 only focused on Delaware’s ozone
concentrations.
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state requesting that the EPA require pollution reductions from a polluting source that has
significantly contributed to nonattainment in the petitioning state (EPA 2021g). While there is
not an equivalent of Section 126 petitions for upwind states, this study analyzes records of when
West Virginia joined or filed amicus curiae briefs for legal cases to challenge federal rules on
cross-state air pollution.
To understand the stringency of both states’ environmental policies, this study analyzes
their regulation and enforcement actions. Recall Hypotheses 2 and 6 where higher amounts of
pollution received are expected to result in more strict regulation and enforcement while higher
amounts contributed are likely to result in less.
Regulatory competition is the most difficult variable to measure when taking an isolated
look at individual states, but there are clues as to whether Delaware and West Virginia are
engaging in regulatory competition within their environmental regulations. For example, if
Delaware has matched other more environmentally minded states by adopting stricter
regulations, that may be an indication that Delaware is engaging in regulatory competition and
racing to the top. If West Virginia never exceeds the stringency required by federal standards,
then that could indicate that West Virginia is racing to the bottom.
Results

Using the EPA’s modeling data for 2017 and 2021, the analysis found that West
Virginia contributes a much higher amount of air pollution to other states than Delaware does.
Delaware contributed to around 50 ppb of ozone both years, while West Virginia contributed
almost 700 ppb in 2017 and almost 400 ppb in 2021. It is not clear what caused West Virginia’s
contributions to other states to drop so severely from 2017 to 2021, but it could be the effect of
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tightened federal regulations or the result of the COVID-19 pandemic decreasing overall
economic activity.
The available data show that the vast majority of Delaware’s ozone concentrations is
the result of emissions from outside of Delaware. Each year, Delaware’s emissions contributed
a small percentage to its ozone concentrations compared to other states’ emissions; In 2011,
2017, and 2021, Delaware’s emissions made up 5.2, 5.5, and 8.6 percent respectively of the
total contributions from state sources. Unlike Delaware, West Virginia’s emissions made up
about a third of all state contributions to its own ozone levels. In 2017 and 2021 West
Virginia’s emissions made up 32.5 and 36.3 percent respectively of the total state contributions.
The following results include non-state sources, which allows them to provide a fuller
picture of the emission sources that led to ozone creation in Delaware and West Virginia. In
2017, Delaware emissions contributed 1.77 ppb of ozone, or 2.7 percent of all ozone in
Delaware that year. In 2021, Delaware’s emissions had an impact of 2.87 ppb, or 4.5 percent of
total contributions. Other states were the largest contributors to Delaware’s ozone as they
contributed 64.7 percent in 2017 and 54.8 percent in 2021. This drop in other states’
contributions could be the result of the federal implementation of the CSAPR Update, which
began in May 2017, or the pandemic’s effect on overall economic activity. In 2017, West
Virginia contributed 12.45 ppb to its own ozone concentrations, or 20 percent of total
contributions. Similarly in 2021, West Virginia contributed 12.96 ppb to its ozone
concentrations, with a small increase to 21.7 percent of total contributions. Other states and
non-state sources contributed similar amounts to West Virginia’s ozone concentrations: other
states contributed 41 percent in 2017 and 37.7 percent in 2021, while non-state sources
contributed 39 percent in 2017 and 40.4 percent in 2021.
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All modeling data of contributions to Delaware’s ozone show that other states are the
main contributors, that Delaware often contributes below five percent to its own ozone
concentrations, and that it contributes very little cross-state air pollution to other states.
According to Hypotheses 1 through 4, since Delaware receives high amounts of pollution, it
should engage in higher levels of environmental effort. West Virginia contributes high amounts
of cross-state air pollution to other states and receives much less cross-state air pollution
compared to Delaware; Hypotheses 5 through 8 predict that West Virginia engages in lower
levels of environmental effort.
Nevertheless, as the relationship between cross-state air pollution and state behaviors is
not well understood, the analysis discussed above cannot demonstrate a causal relationship but
will rather show if an association between the variables exists.
Between 2016 and 2021, Delaware filed four separate Section 126 Petitions regarding
different polluting facilities outside of Delaware, more than all other states combined
(Environmental and Energy Law Program 2020). Delaware continued to pursue the legal
challenges that it started by suing the EPA twice over its delay to respond to its petitions and
appealing the EPA’s decision to deny its petitions. Delaware’s Section 126 Petitions are not the
only time that Delaware has challenged the federal government to reduce cross-state air
pollution. In 2013, Delaware joined seven other states to petition the EPA to require upwind
states to reduce their emissions (Min 2013). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 as
states with more severe cross-state air pollution problems have engaged in litigation efforts to
increase federal enforcement on upwind polluters.
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West Virginia has not filed any Section 126 Petitions, likely because it does not receive
much cross-state air pollution and is an upwind polluter itself. There does not seem to be a
counterpart of Section 126 Petitions that requests that the federal government ease enforcement
on upwind polluters. However, upwind states including West Virginia have attempted to affect
the stringency of federal regulations by getting involved in suits against the EPA. This occurred
in 2013 when several upwind states and localities, along with energy generation companies,
argued before the Supreme Court in Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City
Generation. Upwind states argued that the EPA violated the system of cooperative federalism
by announcing new requirements for upwind states and immediately telling upwind states how
they must implement the new regulations. West Virginia did not join the case officially, but
instead filed an amicus curiae, or “friend of the court,” brief with other states in favor of the
respondents’ argument (SCOTUS Blog, n.d.).
Delaware appears to have responded to the effects of cross-state air pollution by
ensuring its emitting sources are held to strict regulations to decrease ozone concentrations,
and has made two changes to its air quality regulations in the past 10 years that affect ozone
creation. In 2013, Delaware established a Low Emission Vehicle (LEV) program, which
implemented California’s standards for motor vehicles as allowed in Section 177 of the CAA.
California’s standards are tougher than federal regulations for motor vehicles and only 16 states
have adopted them (EPA 2020a; California Air Resources Board 2021). Delaware implemented
another new regulation in 2017 that updated the control of nitrogen oxide emissions from
industrial boilers and process heaters. The text of this regulation includes a specific reference
to Delaware being in nonattainment for ozone, stating that “NOx emission reductions from the
affected boilers and heaters shall contribute to (1) attainment and maintenance of the 8-hour

49

State Government Responses to Cross-State Air Pollution: The Effect of Problem Severity

ozone standard, and (2) improvement of the ambient air quality, in both Delaware and the
entire NAA” (Title 7 Natural Resources & Environmental Control Delaware Administrative
Code, 1142 Specific Emission Control Requirements § 2.0 2017).4 Delaware’s introduction of
both regulations aligns with Hypothesis 2, which predicted that states that receive more
cross-state air pollution are more likely to increase the stringency of their air pollution control
measures.
The hypotheses predicted that West Virginia, as a state that contributes high amounts of
cross-state air pollution, would move in the other direction and roll back its air quality
measures because it can freeride on downwind states. West Virginia has not relaxed its
regulations but rather has kept them only as strict as required by the federal government. The
Technical Analyst from West Virginia’s DEP explained that “the State Code prohibits state
rules from being more stringent than federal regulations." This means any changes to West
Virginia air quality regulations must already be required by the federal government. In 2015
and 2018, West Virginia made changes to its permitting system for polluting facilities. While it
is not clear whether all of these changes made the permitting system more strict, the change in
2015 was specifically geared towards permitting for polluting facilities “which cause or
contribute to nonattainment” (EPA 2020b). In 2018, West Virginia also updated its regulations
controlling “Ozone Season Nitrogen Oxides Emissions” and referenced the requirements of the
Cross-State Air Pollution and its NO X Ozone trading system (Title 45 Legislative Rule, Series
40 2019).
West Virginia has had more than double the number of polluting facilities in operation
compared to Delaware each year since 2014. West Virginia had an average of 329 polluting
4

NAA refers to the PA-DE-MD-NJ non-attainment area.
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facilities from 2013 to 2021 compared to Delaware’s 139 facilities. An analysis of states’
monitoring and enforcement actions found that Delaware engaged in an average of 520.89
compliance monitoring activities each year, or an average of 3.76 monitoring actions for each
of Delaware’s polluting facilities. West Virginia only engaged in an average of 2.22 monitoring
actions per polluting facility, which is close to the national average of 2.2 monitoring actions
per facility. However, Delaware had far fewer enforcement actions on average, with only .024
enforcement actions per facility, when compared to the average for all states at .039 actions per
facility. West Virginia conducted more enforcement actions than Delaware and the national
average, with an average of .059 enforcement actions per polluting facility. But the number of
West Virginia’s enforcement actions seem much more variable from year to year, as they range
from .011 to .148 actions per facility. This variability suggests that West Virginia’s government
does not have a consistent commitment to ensuring that polluting facilities are complying with
environmental regulations. Overall, Delaware engages in more monitoring activities than the
national average, but conducts fewer enforcement actions. While these results could indicate
that Delaware is easy on polluters, this paper contends that the threat of monitoring motivates
polluters to follow regulations leaving Delaware’s government with less need to penalize them
through enforcement actions. West Virginia engages in fewer monitoring actions than the
national average, but more enforcement actions. These findings do not fully match the
hypotheses that expect a downwind state like Delaware to engage in more enforcement
practices than an upwind state like West Virginia.
Just as the Program Administrator described, records of Delaware’s regulatory and
enforcement activities show that Delaware’s polluting units are well controlled with stringent
regulations to keep ozone concentrations low, matching expectations from Hypothesis 2. But
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due to cross-state air pollution, Delaware continues to fail the ozone NAAQS and the EPA
requires Delaware’s government to revise its SIP and implement programs to reach attainment.
The official expressed that there is not much more Delaware can do. One of the few options
remaining to decrease ozone concentrations which are mostly due to out-of-state emissions is
to adopt another one of California’s programs, called the Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV)
regulations.
Given the high standards that Delaware sets for polluting industries, it appears that
Delaware could be racing to the top. Delaware’s government has kept tight restrictions on
polluters and has even adopted California’s stricter motor vehicle regulations just like
Delaware’s geographic neighbors. Konisky (2007) has suggested that certain state-level factors
may cause states to either race to the top or race to the bottom. The data on Delaware and other
downwind states’ behaviors suggests that a high amount of cross-state air pollution could
determine the nature of a state’s regulatory competition as predicted in Hypotheses 3 and 4, but
a more rigorous analysis is required to prove this relationship.
West Virginia has a so-called stringency law that requires state regulations not to go
beyond the strictness of federal standards. For this reason, it is likely that West Virginia is
engaging in regulatory competition and racing to the bottom by keeping their standards as
loose as possible.
Conclusion

By focusing on Delaware and West Virginia’s litigation history, their regulation and
enforcement practices, and through consideration of regulatory competition, this study found
that between 2011 and 2021 Delaware, a downwind state, exhibited more environmental effort
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to decrease cross-state air pollution than West Virginia, an upwind state. Delaware’s
government attempted to decrease cross-state air pollution by making Section 126 Petitions to
the federal government and adopted strict regulations that reduced Delaware’s ozone
concentrations as much as possible. However, despite Delaware’s effort, the problem of
cross-state air pollution remains severe. Rather than petition the government to increase federal
enforcement on upwind polluters, West Virginia joined legal efforts to prevent federal
enforcement. While West Virginia engaged in more enforcement practices compared to
Delaware, it has less stringent regulations and engaged in fewer monitoring actions. It also
appears that West Virginia is racing to the bottom by limiting state regulations from being more
stringent than federal requirements.
These findings have several implications. For Delaware’s government, this analysis
may demonstrate that the state’s actions are inadequate to significantly reduce cross-state air
pollution. Government officials may choose to pursue other types of solutions that could have a
greater effect on Delaware’s ozone levels. Similarly, these results may inform the federal
government that it needs to take a larger role in addressing interstate pollution as states like
Delaware do not have enough influence to make a difference. Several upwind states including
West Virginia are only able to increase the stringency of their regulations if the federal
government first introduces more severe requirements. The federal government may also
choose to alter whether it considers downwind states like Delaware to be responsible for their
own air quality problems. Currently, the EPA requires states in nonattainment to submit a new
SIP with more strict requirements. But downwind states have little influence over their own air
quality as they often contribute less than 10 percent of their own ozone concentrations.
Meanwhile, the upwind states that contribute air pollution to Delaware can enjoy better air
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quality and may even be able to avoid nonattainment.
For a preliminary study such as this, there are benefits of looking closely at two cases to
attempt to understand what type of casual relationships may be operating. However, this
study’s focus on only Delaware and West Virginia has its limitations. While this study briefly
mentioned the behavior of other downwind and upwind states, it is possible that their responses
to cross-state air pollution are different from Delaware’s and West Virginia’s. This study also
did not consider any states that receive and contribute high amounts of pollution or states that
receive and contribute low levels of pollution, the other cells in the typology appearing in
Table 1. Additionally, much of the analysis lacks robust statistical analysis which could provide
evidence for potential causal relationships.
The next step in this research is to conduct case studies on states that receive and emit
varying levels of cross-state air pollution to understand their behaviors. After theoretically
developing the causal mechanisms for different state typologies, one could empirically test the
relationships between cross-state air pollution and state behaviors. This literature could then be
applied to understand governments’ responses to other types of pollution that cross borders.
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The Proxy Goes Both Ways: Digital Propaganda of Yemen’s Houthi Movement
Charlie Blomberg, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Abstract

In this paper, I examine and analyze the Houthi movement’s online propaganda platform.
The Houthis, officially known as Ansar Allah, have participated in a devastating civil war in
Yemen that has led to one of the worst humanitarian crises in recent history. In the process of this
rebellion, the Houthis have relied on digital communication and social media to rally millions of
Yemenis in rebellion against the central government, undermining regional stability and igniting
a proxy conflict involving regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. This paper first
examines the context and positionality of the Houthi movement in present day Yemen, as well as
the literature surrounding propaganda, online extremism, and imagery used by political actors to
disseminate propaganda, recruit militants, and attract international attention. This is followed by
an analysis of digital propaganda disseminated by the Houthi propaganda wing, considering both
local and regional influences on the content produced by the movement. Lastly, this article
examines the implications of international support and attention for the Yemeni civil war in the
context of their continuing propaganda efforts.
Introduction

The civil war in Yemen has resulted in an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis,
where nearly 80% of the population is in need of international assistance (Sharp, 2021, p. 14).
At the center of this conflict lies the Houthis, a movement which emerged out of northwestern
Yemen during the 2015 civil war and has since taken over large swaths of the country. Initially a
Zaydist family in Yemen’s Sa’da governorate, the Houthis have expanded to control the nation’s
capital of Sa’na and most of western Yemen. They are also currently known by the Arabic term
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Ansar Allah (“Champions of God”), extending membership to the movement beyond familial
boundaries. The Houthis have relied on digital media to consolidate political and social control
of their territory throughout their rise in Yemen. Their media presence ranges from conventional
television programs to social media campaigns, allowing them to control the national narrative
surrounding the ongoing conflict (Salmoni et. al, 2010, p. 16). Mirroring other armed groups in
the region, the Houthi movement’s digital communications infrastructure has become
increasingly sophisticated, using a wide variety of platforms and content to reach broad
audiences within the country. In this paper, I will deconstruct the Houthi movement’s digital
propaganda infrastructure. I will use elements of propaganda studies and studies of visual culture
to analyze Houthi media, examining how they mechanize varied content and rhetorical strategies
in achieving their political objectives. I argue that the content of Houthi propaganda is
characterized by their identity of statelessness in regards to Yemen as a whole, integrating
external actors into their media in order to capitalize on a set of “shared truths” among the
Yemeni people. Through this effort, the Houthis illustrate the fractured nature of Yemeni identity,
while using shrewd messaging to characterize their rebellion as a part of a broader religious and
political struggle.
Propaganda, Extremism, and the Power of the Image

In order to contextualize Ansar Allah’s use of digital media as propaganda, the
terminology surrounding their content must be outlined and understood. The term “propaganda,”
used expansively and often liberally in regards to media, can be understood in a number of
ways. Since the end of the first world war, when “propaganda” entered the common vernacular
of English-speaking society, the term has drawn significant debate surrounding its connotation
and utility in academic discourse (Cunnigham, 2002, p. 3). Defining what constitutes
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propaganda– deviating from entertainment or otherwise unbiased forms of social informing–can
be an almost impossible task. Cunningham (2002) describes this difficulty in The Idea of
Propaganda as a postmodern conundrum, where an academic aversion to the notion of absolute
truth leads to a focus on “idioms of power and social control” instead of the degree of truth
within a piece of media (p. 13). At its core, propaganda can be understood in a vast number of
ways, and its demonstrated ambiguity can lead theorists to focus on the context of propaganda
production rather than its denotative nature.
The way in which propaganda is understood in academic literature is largely derived from
the foundational works of American propagandist Edward Bernays, who outlined the theory and
practice of manipulating public opinion in works such as Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923)
and Propaganda (1928) (Olasky, 1984, p. 3). Bernays understood propaganda as a reorganization
of the economy of choice, capitalizing on existing attitudes and feelings in order to alter
conceptions of truth when one decides, cast a vote, or go to war (Olasky, 1984, p. 3). These
attitudes and feelings are thereby “associated and regimented for common action,” where the
prescribed action can lead to political or economic choices among a diverse set of options
(Bernays, 1928, p. 13). Bernays does not acknowledge the moral implication of propaganda as a
malign practice, however, alleging that propaganda is necessary in order to prioritize an infinite
field of potential choices in public life. This sentiment is echoed in Noam Chomsky and Edward
Herman’s Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media, where the authors
argue that propaganda is necessary as a means of codifying values and integrating individuals
into society on a broad scale. However, the degree to which states and media bodies are able to
effectively administer propaganda is dependent on the circumstances in which it is produced.
Chomsky and Herman assert in Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass
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Media that monopolistic control of mass media streamlines the marginalization of dissident
viewpoints, removing the filters of advertising, competition, and the presence of “expertise”
outside the propagandists’ governing dogma (Chomsky and Herman, 2008, p. 62). This makes
the propagandists’ conception of truth unassailable in the space of mass media, although the
advent of social media offers an alternative space for political discourse and consensus
production (Dodds, 2018, p. 650). In democratic media spaces, the idea of propaganda becomes
blurred by conceptions of truth and perspective expressed by multiple sources. A broad spectrum
of available viewpoints can thereby eliminate the clear distinction between propaganda and
honest informing, making way for disagreement regarding the nature of any item of media. As a
result, when the concept or pursuit of truth cannot be reasonably agreed upon, the propagandist’s
intention of establishing political or social control becomes the primary lens through which
propaganda is understood.
Cull et. al. (2003) complicates this issue by noting the negative connotation surrounding
propaganda, despite its potential for constructive persuasion in the pursuit of better governance
(p. xvii). Nonetheless, in their expansive encyclopedia of propaganda’s use and misuse
throughout history, Cull et. al. agree that the most important distinguishing feature of propaganda
is the intention of its creator, in that propaganda constitutes “conscious, deliberate attempts to
employ the techniques of persuasion to attain specific goals” (p. xix). This definition omits the
idea of disinformation in its outline, arguing that state uses of political messaging can be
productive regardless of the content’s subjectivity. The United States Department of Defense
characterizes propaganda in similar terms, describing propaganda as “any form of adversary
communication, especially of biased or misleading nature, designed to influence the opinions,
emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or
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indirectly” (Winkler and Dauber, 2014, p. 7). This removes the state itself from the definition of
propaganda, limiting it to “adversary communication.” Despite this, the DOD uses a similar
notion of intent and desired political effect in their categorization. This leaves room for
government officials to interpret what constitutes disinformation and direct intent in adversarial
media, underscoring both the subjectivity of propaganda as a concept and the tendency for
foreign communication to be labeled as propaganda without significant forethought. While
varying in their respective conceptions of the role of truth within propaganda, the
aforementioned definitions help to build an understanding of propaganda as it relates to political
coordination and public opinion. Propaganda is characterized by deliberate actions taken by
groups in order to achieve political or social goals, using varied forms of communication in
doing so. Aside from the intentions of the creator, political messaging can be also understood
through its intended receivers, where the attributes of an audience determine their “susceptibility
to persuasion” (Jamieson and Kenski, 2017, p. 60). In this case, the identity and attitudes of an
audience determine a piece of propaganda’s intrinsic value. For the purpose of this study, the
nature of the Houthis’ audience plays a significant role in determining the value systems in
which the Houthis aim to exploit in their media outreach. In doing so, they draw on strategies
developed by other non-state actors and existing images within the Yemeni cultural psyche.
While the Houthi movement’s use of media is scarcely studied in academic literature, the
use of digital media by militant groups in the Middle East is well documented (Awan, 2017, p.
3). Since the internet became a popular mechanism for exchanging ideas, separatist groups and
other actors have adopted online communication platforms as a decentralized hub for
communication. In the case of the Islamic State, the most studied non-state actor in terms of their
digital media output, social media served as a powerful tool in supporting their recruiting and
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consolidation efforts in the Levant (Karagiannopoulos, 2012, p. 170). In contrast to the Islamic
State, however, the Houthi movement has made no indication in their content that recruitment
from other states is a primary goal. Cull et. al (2003) finds that many Islamist groups are just as
outwardly focused as they are towards local leadership, finding use in imagery beyond the
borders of a particular state (p. 343). Cultural and political symbols common throughout the
Islamic world can draw upon an idea of unity that preexists contemporary boundaries. Political
media expert Doris Graber cites the power of imagery in political messaging, a dimension of
propaganda that has been substantially less studied than the use of rhetoric and verbiage (Graber,
1989, p. 145). As content becomes more complex in both production value and ease of
transmission, propaganda creators have built upon existing strategies in the power of imagery
and emotion in their work. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz writes that images are central to the
construction of reality, creating a set of quasi-religious values that garner “what they perhaps
most need to be coercive: the appearance of objectivity” (Geertz, 1957, p. 627). Religion is
defined in more abstract terms here, relating to an adherence to practices and values that
supersede conscious deliberation.
This sentiment is echoed in the work of Gruber and Haugbolle (2013), who dissect the
role of images in the modern Middle East. They note that visual imagery “projects a kind of
reality through visual signs,” where the meaning of the message is determined by both the
creator and audience (p. xiii). This reflects the same framework as the work of Cunningham
(2002) and Cull et. al. (2003), determining the meaning of imagery and its effect on attitudes and
beliefs based on the message itself and the existing identity of the audience. In the digital era,
where the creation and dissemination of imagery has never been easier, the development of
narratives surrounding war and conflict allows ample room for manipulation. However, Apel
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(2012) notes that “controlling the visual field” can fail as a result of an excess of available
information (p. 153). The task of the propagandist, in this case, becomes the selection of visual
material that has the greatest chance for resonance.
Humble Beginnings

Yemen has experienced internal conflict since it was established as a sovereign nation in
1990. In addition to their participation in a brief civil war in 1994, the Houthis’ original region of
Northwestern Yemen’s Sa’da governorate has been in near continuous conflict with the central
government, where the central government has exercised “an extremely attenuated level of
control” (Salmoni et. al., 2010, p. 3). The government of Yemen has engaged with separatist
movements in Northwestern Yemen in brief conflicts known as the “Sa’da Wars,” broken up by
momentary ceasefires that illustrate the tenuous relationship between people of Northwestern
Yemen and any form of central government. In response to president Saleh’s dispatch of troops
into Northwestern Yemen in 2004, the Houthi family became a larger phenomenon than a
competing tribe in Sa’da. More and more people in Yemen began to call themselves Houthis in
solidarity against the central government, looking to the Houthi clan for political and religious
guidance (Salmoni et. al., 2010, p. 8). This marks the beginning of “Houthi” being referred to as
a broader political movement instead of a tribal network, where the term lends itself to a set of
ideological similarities rather than tribal ones. However, as of 2010, the Houthis still had not
demonstrated a strong degree of organizational or ideological cohesion across their growing
ranks (Salmoni et. al., 2010, p. 9). Their emerging political influence in the country was not
solidified or particularly different from other tribal alliances at the time and faced a “scorched
earth” strategy employed by the central government to stomp out the Houthi movement (Filiu,
2015, p. 143). Nonetheless, during the events of the 2011 Arab spring, which emboldened
Yemenis to rise up against their government, the Houthis played a role in the ousting of President
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Ali Abdullah Saleh and rallying the people of Sa’da (Hill, 2017, p. 179). Emerging from this
deepening vacuum was Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Southern Transitional
Council (STC), and other tribal networks vying for regional supremacy. The STC and AQAP still
exercise political control over portions of the country in Yemen’s Southwest and East,
respectively.
During the events of the 2015 civil war, the Houthis emerged as a contender for national
supremacy. Not only had they become broader than their initial status as a tribal group in the
Sa’da governorate, they unified large swaths of previously competing tribal networks in order to
depose the centralized government. In its current form, the Houthis’ ‘nation’ can be described as
a proto-state. While not being internationally recognized as legitimate, they exercise near-total
autonomy in the territories they hold, as evidenced by a monopolistic hold on their territory’s
education, economic, and media infrastructures (Salmani et. al., 2010, p. 217). Proto-states are
described by Eleftheriadou (2021) as territorial clusters within a larger state that “contest the
right of central authorities to govern, raising competing claims to authority and popular
representation” (p. 2). These competing claims became a measure of the Houthis against other
regional factions rather than against local players in Northern Yemen. Within the Houthi
proto-state, however, lies a dizzying array of local kinship and tribal networks that predate the
existence of Yemen as a country, which have competed for territory and influence in the region
since the area was first settled. These networks have defied the centralized governance emerging
after Yemen became a sovereign state, preferring local traditions of justice and political
mediation over the bureaucracy in Sana’a. As such, holding these contending groups together
necessitates the use of propaganda in order to build national identity in a place devoid of such
patriotism.
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Ansar Allah’s media apparatus has grown in conjunction with their territory, becoming
increasingly complex as social media allows information and media to be transmitted with
increasing ease. Building upon recordings and broadcasts of founder Hussein Al-Houthi’s
lectures and interviews, the Houthi media platform evolved to include chants, online sites, and
videos beginning in 2007 (Salmani et. al., 2010, p. 217). The Houthis’ television channel, Al
Masirah, was founded in 2012 and functions as an all-encompassing media hub for the Houthis
(Porter, 2020). Al-Masirah is located physically in the Hezbollah stronghold of south Beirut,
receiving logistical support from Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, their own flagship television channel
(Transfeld, 2017). While Al-Masirah’s internet presence has been curbed across U.S domains,
the Houthis maintain complete control over the information apparatus of their territory. By
stationing their primary media apparatus outside of their country, the Houthis are able to avoid
Saudi interference in their information network and receive logistical support from Hezbollah’s
media wing (Levitt, 2021, p. 18). As social media became increasingly popular in the Arab
world, as did the circulation of Houthi content via platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and
Telegram, allowing digital content to be reproduced by Yemenis who act as propagandists in
their own right.
As such, the scale of Houthi propaganda is incredibly vast. Beyond official sources of
media, snippets and copies of Houthi content are reproduced on social media platforms such as
Twitter, YouTube, WhatsApp, and Telegram, contributing to a complex web of content that
crosses between technological and ideological boundaries. For the purpose of this study, the
content and form of three specific propaganda pieces will be analyzed for common imagery,
rhetorical strategy, and regional influence. Each piece of media was selected based on its
similarities to overarching visual and rhetorical themes within Houthi propaganda.
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Figure 1: Houthi soldiers pray between clashes with Hadi forces.
The first examined piece of propaganda comes directly from Ansar Allah’s website,
ansarollah.net, where they offer updates on battlefield action, publish essays from Houthi
leadership, and disseminate digital content. Figure 1 shows a frame of the video “Tawilu Al Harb
Alayna,” meaning “long live our war,” and illustrating Houthi soldiers praying between clashes
with Hadi forces. The video begins in English, showing the U.S Capitol building and Flag with a
heavy red tint overlaid on top of it. A snippet of an American press release proclaims, “we have
been informed that the kingdom of Saudi Arabia launched military operations in Yemen,”
leading into a montage of Saudi Arabian fighter jets overlaid with the same red tint. The
beginning of the video disregards subtlety in outlining oppositional forces in the United States
and Saudi Arabia, contextualizing the imagery that follows it under the guise of American and
Saudi aggression. The video then leads into a sequence of the perceived results of this
aggression, showing children injured or killed in airstrikes as triumphant music fades into focus.
The emotional appeal of strongly negative imagery is described in Graber (1990) as a strategy

75

The Ramerican Political Science Review, Volume 7, 2022

pioneered by cable news outlets, creating a “video malaise” that generates lasting emotional
effects (p. 153). The use of extreme imagery in propaganda allows the viewer to unconsciously
build relations of opposites regarding political issues and figures, associating one side with
absolute injustice and the other with its antithesis.
This transition illustrates a common theme within Houthi propaganda and Islamist
iconography, where human suffering is represented as both a political catalyst and an object of
aestheticization (Gruber and Haugbolle, 2013, p. 117). The image of an injured or dead child
represents the purity of God being unjustly marred by violence, creating the need for vengeance
against the “guilty others” who perpetrated it (Gruber and Haugbolle, 2013, p. 118). In this
manner, violence against children is portrayed as both a political and religious call to action,
urging all Muslims and Yemenis to enact justice against a godless foe. Immediately after this
sequence, with the lyrics of the song beginning, the viewer is confronted with a mirror depiction
of the war’s violence. Imagery of Houthi soldiers, armored vehicles, and combat flashes across
the screen as the music continues, demonstrating how Ansar Allah presents righteous violence
and unjust suffering as disparate and yet similarly glorified motifs within their propaganda,
where the death of innocents acts as cause for retaliatory warfare. Jaap van Ginneken (2003)
describes the use of violent imagery in Collective Behavior and Public Opinion: Rapid Shifts in
Opinion and Communication as a presentation of moral conflict. Van Ginneken notes that
collective opinion can be readily manipulated by the knowledge of a perceived injustice, leading
to a self-sustaining “spiral of violence” that justifies itself as it gains momentum (Van Ginneken,
2003, p. 202). Imagery of death is commonplace within Islamist media productions, serving as a
method of social informing for prospective viewers. Martyrdom in the name of a broader
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religious conflict is cast over the entirety of the Houthi cause, whether through an active role (via
fighting) or a passive one (noncombatant deaths).
The use of Islam as a political and rhetorical tool is omnipresent in Houthi media. At
[0:44], as seen in Figure 1, Houthi soldiers are depicted in prayer with rifles strapped to their
backs. This imagery places piety and violence within the same cultural frame, denoting the
religious underpinnings of the Houthis’ fight for Yemen. Imagery of praying soldiers is repeated
at [0:58] and [3:10], interwoven with lyrics such as “what we have undergone / for only God and
none other” (Long Live our War: Ansar Allah Group Performance). Geertz (1957) notes that the
efficacy of religion in underscoring social values lies in “the ability of its symbols to formulate a
world in which those values, as well as the forces opposing their realization, are fundamental
ingredients” (p. 627). In this manner, the Houthis’ use of Islamic symbols in both their imagery
and messaging allows them to construct a reality in which their cause is synonymous with that of
Islam itself. Even though the direct enemies of the Houthis on the ground are Muslims
themselves, religious rhetoric contributes to a body of symbols that seeks to redefine spirituality,
citizenship, and duty through the Houthi cause.
Beyond the opening minute, the remainder of the video follows a similar pattern.
Sequences of violence committed by and against the Houthis are followed by images of piety
among soldiers, military technology, and Houthi leaders. Each sequence lasts between two and
ten seconds, leaving little time for the viewer to digest the content before proceeding to the next
sequence. The veracity of each sequence is therefore set aside, favoring the construction of
sentiment over convincing the public of a specific political goal. Instead, the creators deftly
crisscross between portrayals of enemies and martyrs. Chomsky and Herman (2008) cite the idea
of worthy and unworthy victims, whose suffering or death is placed on a moral scale defined by
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sectarian or religious affiliation rather than the context of the suffering itself (p. 97). By defining
and repeating an idea of moral worth to the public, the consequences of political and military
action are separated from the cause itself, removing humanity from the enemy and reinforcing
the value of continued violence.
No mention is made of Hadi forces or other competing factions within the country, nor is
the war mentioned as a fight for self-determination, civil rights, or economic opportunity. The
de-specification of conflict messaging is pervasive in Houthi media, where specific details or
actors in the war itself appear to have little presence in the content being produced. This
dichotomy will be explored in further detail, outlining the unifying and dividing factors that
contribute to Houthi generalization.

Figure 2: Issa Al-Laith sings in front of Houthi martyrs in “Nation of Truth.”
Similar usage of religion, external enemies, and music is present in Issa Al-Laith’s
“Nation of Truth,” a music video published on YouTube with over 900,000 views. Al-Laith is a
popular Houthi musician and performer, whose official channel has more than 925,000
subscribers. Al-Laith’s channel and other Houthi performers boast much larger subscriber counts
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and view totals than official Ansar Allah media, whose YouTube channels number between
20,000 and 75,000 subscribers (YouTube). The production value of Al-Laith’s content is also
much higher than the video in Figure 1, using high-definition drone footage and actors in
conjunction with the mountaintop scene pictured in Figure 2. The increased popularity and
quality of a content producer less directly tied to the Houthis is worth noting, possibly due to
stronger engagement on social media with those regarded as celebrities in popular culture.
As the music video begins, Al-Laith is seen brandishing a traditional Yemeni Jambiya
dagger and an AK-47 rifle atop a mountain. Similar to the ansarollah.net video, the music of the
video is modeled after traditional Yemeni Zawamil, or tribal poems, with the addition of modern
background music to form a cohesive song. These poems have long been used as a means of
tribal mediation, historical documentation, and cultural identification among the disparate
networks of the country. The Houthis’ return to Zawamil as a rhetorical tool allow them to
“instigate sentiments of sovereignty, chivalry, and victory” among their audience, capitalizing on
an existing cultural vernacular in order to equate embedded traditions with Ansar Allah’s victory
(Naji, 2022). When integrated with contemporary music, patriotism and pop culture work
together in a blend of traditional and emerging cultural practices. Using music within propaganda
"lends itself to patriotic appeals since the latter depends upon an emotional response, and music
is well suited to the expression of emotions" (Cull et. al., 2003, p. 255). These videos strike the
intersection of antiquity and innovation in the media space, building on long standing attitudes
and beliefs while ensuring engagement with the young population.
The use of historical themes along with contemporary visual strategies is consistent
throughout Al-Laith’s video, along with the characterization of the Houthi cause as an expression
of Jihad. At [0:51], a group of actors dressed in traditional Yemeni warrior garb cry out while

79

The Ramerican Political Science Review, Volume 7, 2022

brandishing swords, spears, and shields, illustrating the connection between the present conflict
and a longstanding warrior tradition in Yemen. Similar to Long Live Our War, Al-Laith’s video is
interspersed with sequences of heroic violence, using actors alongside raw combat footage. Just
as Long Live Our War displays imagery of the American enemy in contrast to Houthi soldiers,
Al-Laith’s video shows an American Humvee being attacked and the soldiers within it killed at
[0:41]. The lyrics coinciding with this imagery read “From our fathers’ wealth, America, run,”
indicating direct opposition to the United States and a threat of future violence.
The rhetorical strategies employed in Al-Laith’s video are more subtle than in Long Live
Our War, making a series of choices that present the same imagery in a more palatable manner.
Raw videos of Hadi soldiers being shot are replaced by montages of actors holding rifles,
America and Saudi Arabia are referenced visually without a clear red overlay, and causal
relationships between foreign aggression and domestic suffering are implied rather than directly
stated. Nonetheless, both videos employ the same visual strategies and capitalize on the same
cultural vernacular in order to engage the audience. Strength and masculinity are displayed in
both productions through individual weaponry and military vehicles. In addition to the
reinforcement of masculinity, weapons can demonstrate individual and collective autonomy for
tribal Yemenis (Salmoni et. al., 2010, p. 36). Individuals holding weapons–even without a
demonstrated need for them–are statements of sovereignty over the self and the community.
As is seen in Figure 2, the role of martyrdom within Houthi culture is displayed by the
placards behind the performer. The men on the left and center of the frame are former Houthi
leaders Hussein Al-Houthi and Saleh Al-Sammad, killed by GOY and Saudi military operations,
respectively. Connecting slain Houthi officials to the construct of martyrdom strengthens the idea
of Houthis as mujahideen, religious warriors fighting to preserve political Islam and protect the
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country from disbelievers. This practice has been evident in Houthi media for more than a
decade, posturing the conflict as a long-standing battle for an Islamic cause (Salmoni et. al.,
2010, p. 225). These figures have direct administrative and ethnic ties to the Houthi movement,
with Hussein Al-Houthi acting as the movement’s founder and patriarch until his death in 2004.
More perplexing, however, is the presence of Iranian Security officer Qasem Soleimani, pictured
on the right side of Figure 2. Despite his 2020 assassination by U.S airstrike in Baghdad having
little to do with the conflict in Yemen, his status as a martyr is widely publicized within Houthi
publications and media. As his face is presented beside the foundational leaders of the Houthi
movement, Al-Laith chants “the blood of Qasem Soleimani / dawn rises from every place,”
portraying the Iranian official’s death as a pivotal loss for the cause. Through the blood spilled by
the United States, the dawn of the rebellion emerges from every corner of the country.
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Figure 3:  ”الصرخة- The Scream”
Examining the presence of external actors such as Suleimani can be better understood
through the most ubiquitous image disseminated by the Houthis. The Sarkha, or scream, is
composed of five simple lines of Arabic: Allahu Akbar, Al-Mawt li-Amrika, Al-Mawt li-Israyil,
Al-A’ana A’ala Al-Yehud, A-Nar lil-Islam. Translated into English, the Sarkha reads “God is
great, death to America, death to Israel, curse upon the Jews, victory for Islam.” At first glance,
the content of the Houthi slogan appears to be entirely externally oriented, leading one to assume
that the Houthis’ goals lie in the destruction of Israel, the Jews, and America in the name of
Islam. Echoing the sentiment of the Sarkha, Houthi propaganda at large is devoid of visual or
verbal references to Yemen or smaller localities within their content. The overarching enemy
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within their frame of reference is portrayed to be Saudi Arabia, the United States, the United
Arab Emirates, and Israel, making little reference to the Hadi government or STC forces in the
south.
This repeated presence of externalized imagery within Houthi messaging illustrates the
United States and Israel as direct adversaries to the Houthi cause. Even though the United States
is only tangentially involved in the Civil War itself, the Houthis are able to capitalize on
widespread anti-American sentiment that has developed after the events of 9/11 (Salmoni et. al.,
2010, p. 7). Furthermore, Israel has no substantive connection to the conflict in Yemen.
America’s war on terror, which extended into Yemen to combat the rise of AQAP, has solidified
the United States as “as a prominent enemy of Yemeni indigenous rights to self determination”
(Mohamed and El-Desouky, 2021, p. 208). American support for the Hadi government and
strategic interest in Yemen is inimical to the Ansar Allah’s anti-imperial mission, regardless of
their degree of influence in the conflict itself. As such, Yemeni attitudes towards the United
States and Israel are among the few topics the fractured nation can agree upon. The externalized
sentiment of the Sarkha “reduces complex geopolitics to simple religious identifications to win
support from core Houthi supporters along with the broader Yemeni public,” leading to a greater
degree of unity among Houthi sympathizing populations (Mohamed and El-Desouky, 2021, p.
206). In a political campaign against the Hadi government, situated physically within Yemen,
externalizing the “bogeyman” of Houthi rhetoric fosters togetherness among disparate groups
and mobilizes the population against a symbolic enemy. Rhetoric against the United States “calls
for action against America are revalorized as a call to action against the GOY itself,” in a process
of realigning the symbolic and religious meaning of the war (Salmoni et. al., 2010, p. 224).
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In practice, however, the Houthis do not pose a significant threat to the United States. By
their own admission, the Houthi movement’s strong anti-American sentiment is “merely
rhetorical as no imminent threats were ever directed against the US presence in the country”
(Mohamed and El-Desouky, 2021, p. 215). In turn, the United States does not consider the
Houthis to be a terrorist organization despite repeated calls for the death of America (Revocation
of the Terrorist Designations of Ansarallah, 2021). This demonstrates the somewhat hollow
nature of Houthi rhetoric, which is nonetheless effective at fostering unity. Sana’a still belongs
to Ansar Allah, and the Hadi government is no closer to regaining control of the country.
The Yemeni people’s common definition of external enemies can also be understood
through their history of colonial domination. Many lived experiences in the country can be
described both presently and historically as being controlled by states with little connection to
the Yemeni people, much less the kinship networks that define their conception of governing
authority. Even if the United States and Israel are only tangentially involved in the conflict,
resisting the Hadi government can be understood as a resistance to the imperial domination that
characterizes much of the Yemeni nation story. As such, loyalty to the Houthi national cause still
fits within a broader framework of anti-imperialism and adherence to local customs, as that the
movement maintains tribal custom in its ideology (Blumi, 2011, p. 24) (Pridham, 1984, p. 154).
Maintenance of tribal traditions in a practical sense while ignoring them in mass media is
central to identity building between disparate and occasionally warring groups. As a proto state
consisting of diverse polities with complex tribal and kinship networks, the people of Yemen
identify themselves primarily with their religion and family rather than the Yemeni state. This
feeling is amplified in the North, where the Yemeni central government has never been accepted,
much less popular. As such, the use of localized conflicts that have persisted long before
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Yemen’s establishment, or even colonialism, is cause for fracturing within the polity the Houthis
are attempting to construct. Before Yemen was established as a country, the idea of political
unity was considered a possibility only at the cost of political values in respective regions of the
state (Pridham, 1984, p. 263). Effective usage of propaganda is therefore vital in suppressing
dissent and preventing fracturing among those who call themselves “Houthis,” who are already
characterized by a lack of unity (Carter and Carter, 2021, p. 920). Houthi propaganda therefore
seeks to define “Yemen” as it pertains to unifying external forces, choosing to circumvent the
internal schisms that complicate the process of unification.
International Considerations

It has become clear in recent years that Iran lends support to the Houthis in terms of
weapons, logistics support, and training (Sharp, 2021, p. 10). However, it is generally agreed
among scholars that Iran’s participation in Houthi politics is relatively low, and significantly less
than the support lent to Hadi forces by Saudi Arabia (Transfeld, 2017) (Eleftheriadou, 2021, p.
6). Little is known, however, of the degree to which Iran supports the Houthis in the creation and
dissemination of political propaganda. Alternative to previous discussion of Houthi content, the
externalized nature of Houthi messaging suggests that Iran exercises some control over the
content of their propaganda. Additionally, Hezbollah’s proximity and support of Houthi media
production adds an additional dimension of support from Iran, whose rhetorical fingerprints are
evident in Houthi publications. Hezbollah’s construction of identity as a champion of political
Islam is similar to that of the Houthis, indicating a level of understanding between each group’s
presentation of political and religious identity (Alagha, 2011, p. 123). The Houthi slogan itself
was borrowed from Iran’s revolutionary motto, becoming a statement of Yemeni sovereignty
despite its outward-facing language.
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For Iran, funding the Houthi movement is consistent with their operations with Hezbollah
and other militant groups in the region, where creating antagonism between varying groups can
“badger, distract, and waste the resources of its enemies” (Johnston et. al., 2020, p. 64).
However, prevailing literature still suggests that Iran has little use for direct involvement in the
propaganda construction of the Houthi movement. Consolidating Shi’a influence in Yemen is
only productive for Iran insofar as they can control the conversation regarding Yemeni goals,
whose stated political goals rely much more heavily on sovereignty than a commitment to
warfare against Saudi Arabia. This means that the Houthis are a useful tool for Iran only if they
are actively in direct conflict with Saudi Arabia, an outcome that would likely not persist if they
were able to gain complete control of the country. The degree to which Iran– and to a lesser
extent, Hezbollah–exercise control over Houthi media is ultimately up for interpretation. Further
research could find additional links between individuals and practices that are shared between
the three related entities, but such an insight into Iranian grand strategy in the Middle East is
unlikely to be found through conventional sources.
Conclusion

Describing the ongoing conflict in Yemen as strictly a “proxy war” is not an accurate
assessment of the war’s minutiae. The presence and support of Iran in the Houthi movement
cannot be characterized as a relationship of control, but rather a mutually beneficial partnership
that allows both parties to engage in a proxy of their own. Iran can act as a disruptive force to
their regional rival in Saudi Arabia by arming and advising a small portion of the Houthi cause,
creating instability in the Gulf and undermining Saudi state building processes. In turn, the
Houthis readily accept Iranian assistance in order to fight a symbolic war against the United
States and Israel, which ultimately has little to do with their chosen enemies and everything to do
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with creating unity among the Yemeni populace. By capitalizing on existing attitudes shared
between the vast majority of the Yemeni population, the Houthi nation building enterprise is able
to exceed the limits of tribalism and kinship within the political sphere, building a national
identity through established methods of political persuasion. The beliefs behind Houthi
propaganda are ultimately less important than their consequences, which have allowed the
movement to maintain an uneasy hold on a massive portion of the warring country. While victory
in a strict sense is still beyond the horizon for the Houthis, their ability to maintain control of an
area so consistently in opposition to broader political structures is a testament to the success of
their media and military infrastructure. Ansar Allah’s digital communication network is both
sophisticated and effective, relying on knowledge of existing cultural truths within the
population to realign the Yemeni nation story towards their political ends. In the future, any
competing faction within or outside the country will face a significant challenge in uprooting a
movement that has managed to transcend its religious and tribal roots.
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Review of The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics by
Joslyn Barnhart
Alyssa Santoro-Adajian, Virginia Commonwealth University
Joslyn Barnhart’s The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics,
published in 2020, is a thorough, well-written look at what causes humiliation on the
international stage, how humiliated states respond, and the factors and conditions that lead to
various responses. Barnhart defines humiliation as “the emotional response to the perceived
undeserved decline of one’s status in the eyes of others” (p. 83). She argues that there are two
categories of national humiliation; either the state in question falls short of the performance it
considers appropriate for its status, or other states fail to grant the level of recognition the state
believes it deserves. Relevant factors that influence responses include the time elapsed since the
humiliation occurred, the power differential between the humiliated state and its humiliator, and
the “material and political losses” endured (p. 212). Barnhart raises several research questions,
including how humiliation contributes to aggression, what factors influence who the aggression
is directed towards, and whether individuals’ views on national humiliation affect states’
responses. Barnhart’s hypotheses include, among others, that recently humiliated states are more
likely than states not recently humiliated to be aggressive in the aftermath of the event, and that
states that have lost resources due to a humiliating event and since recovered have a higher
chance of performing “assertive status-seeking acts” than states who have not recovered and than
states that have not endured such an event (pp. 211-217).
The quality of Barnhart’s research and writing is high, but the book contains a nontrivial
number of grammatical errors that significantly impact the persuasiveness and perceived
credibility of the research. Barnhart covers significant ground in a relatively short piece of
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writing, which renders the research somewhat hard to follow and the components of the topic
somewhat difficult to track. The text is largely well structured; the introduction provides a
general overview of the integral concepts that will be discussed, the early chapters float theories
that will be covered in detail followed by chapters discussing Barnhart's hypotheses, and the
study is wrapped up with a discussion of historical examples supporting the research. While this
final section of chapters is certainly beneficial to the reader as it provides concrete examples (the
colonization of Africa by France and Germany in the late 1800s and the Cold War between the
United States and former Soviet Union), the format Barnhart chose for the latter half of the text
is somewhat jarring; moving from research conclusions directly to historical context rather than
providing examples along the way arguably impedes the flow of the text unnecessarily.
Nevertheless, Barnhart’s discussion of the various factors influencing humiliation is
thorough and clear. The evidence presented is convincing, and though there are some holes in her
arguments, Barnhart calls attention to these by pointing them out explicitly rather than glossing
them over. This research provides a new perspective for those studying international relations by
raising important questions regarding aspects of conflict on the international stage that have been
previously remarkably under-studied. Further research will undoubtedly bolster the conclusions
Barnhart draws throughout her study. Future researchers may benefit from delving further into
smaller areas within the scope of Barnhart’s research, such as how individual humiliation affects
national humiliation, rather than taking on such a broad subject in its entirety. Still, Barnhart’s
work represents significant steps forward in the study of conflict on the international stage and is
a fantastic starting point on which future research can be based.
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